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ABSTRACT
Contributions are made by this paper in three areas, methodological, data
creation, and empirical.The methodological section finds that, while struc-
tural model building exercises may be useful in suggesting lists of variables
that may play an explanatory role in investment equations, they generally
achieve identification of structural parameters only by imposing arbitrary and
unbelievable simplifying assumptions and exclusion restrictions.The paper
advocates a hybrid methodology combining guidance from traditional structural
models on the choice and form of explanatory variables to be included, with
estimation in a reduced—form format that introduces all explanatory variables
and the lagged dependent variable with the same number of unconstrained lag
coefficients.
The second contribution is the use of a new set of quarterly data for
major expenditure categories of GNP extending back to 1919.The data file
also contains quarterly data back to 1919 for other variables, including the
capital stock, interest rates, the cost of capital including tax incentive
effects, a proxy for Tobin's "Q', and the real money supply.
The empirical results support the view that there are two basic impulses
in the business cycle, real and financial.The real impulse appears in our
statistical evidence as an autonomous innovation to investment in structures.
We interpret these structures innovations as due in turn to changes in the
rate of population growth, episodes of speculation and overbuilding, and
Schumpeterian waves of innovation.The financial impulse works through the
effect on investment of changes in the money supply, as well as the real
interest rate (in the case of postwar investment in durable equipment).There
is a strong role for the money supply as a determinant of investment behavior,
relative to such other factors as the user cost of capital or Tobin's "0...
The role of the money supply is interpreted as primarily reflecting the
banking contraction of 1929—33 and the episodes of credit crunches and
disintermediation in the postwar years.
Another feature of the empirical work is the attention paid to aggre-
gation.Coefficient estimates are more stable when four types of investment
expenditures are aggregated along the structures—equipment dimension than
along the household—business dimension.Historical decompositions highlight
the role of autonomous innovations in structures investment and in the money
supply, and an inspection of residuals suggests that the main autonomous
downward shift in spending in 1929—30 was in fixed investment, not nondurable
consumption.
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I.INTRODUCTION
The behavior of fixed investment is one of the four core topics
(along with consumption, money demand, and the Phillips curve) that have
dominated theoretical and empirical research in macroeconomics during
the postwar era.An understanding of the sources of persistent swings
in investment spending would seem to be a key ingredient in any satis-
factory explanation of business cycles.This paper develops a new data
set and uses a new methodology to investigate the behavior of household
and business fixed investment in the United States since 1919.Its
results have implications for at least four partly overlapping groups of
economists who have strong views about the nature of the fixed invest-
ment process and, indirectly, about the sources of business cycles.
Keynesians, following the General Theory, regard investment
behavior as containing a substantial autonomous component; investment
responds to the state of business confidence and incorporates the effect
of episodes of speculation and overbuilding.The instability and un-
predictability of fixed investment behavior forms, of course, the basis
of Keynesian support for an activist and interventionist role for
government fiscal policy.A crucial and often unstated component of the
Keynesian view is that these autonomous investment movements exhibit
positive serial correlation and last long enough for government action
to be effective.2
In contrast monetarists do not single Out investment for special
attention.Changes in aggregate private spending, consumption and
investment alike, are attributed to prior fluctuations in the supply of
money.Since monetarists are usually reluctant to provide detailed
structural interpretations of what happens inside the black box through
which the influence of money is channeled to economic activity, they are
not concerned whether the primary channel runs through consumption,
investment, or both.But monetarists would expect (if forced uncharac-
teristically to devote special attention to fixed investment behavior)
to find a strong role for the money supply as a primary determinant of
investment behavior.
In addition to the general approaches to macroeconomic analysis
advocated by Keynesians and monetarists, two additional groups of
economists have made a special effort to understand investment behavior.
The "neoclassical" school, represented by the work of Jorgenson and his
collaborators, emphasizes changes in the relative price or "user cost"
of capital as a dominant influence, together with changes in output, on
fluctuations in fixed investment.The user cost of capital is the
primary channel by which both monetary policy (working through interest
rates) and fiscal policy (working through investment tax incentives)
influence the flow of investment spending.The final group consists of
advocates of Tobin's "Q"approach,inwhich the influence on investment
of forward—looking expectations regarding output and capital costs is
captured by a single variable, "Q,"theratio of the market value of
capital to its reproduction cost.Since the dominant portion of
fluctuations in "Q"isaccounted for by changes in stock market prices,
proponents of this approach expect econometric work to single out the3
stock market as an important (or dominant) factor explaining investment
behavior.
Because of the long time span of data covered in the empirical
portion of this paper, its results have implications for the sources of
business cycles in general and of the Great Depression in particular.
Keynesians view business cycles as the inevitable reflection of the
instability of investment spending, which in turn justifies government
intervention to reduce the amplitude of cycles.Keynesian interpreta-
tions of the Great Depression, especially Temin (1976), minimize the
role of monetary factors in the first two years of the 1929—33 contrac-
tion.Monetarists reverse the roles of the government and private
sector and view the basic source of business cycles as autonomous and
largely unexplained fluctuations in the money supply that lead to
fluctuations in private spending.A reduction in the amplitude of
business cycles requires a reduction in the instability originating in
government management of the money supply.
The neoclassical and Qapproachesto the explanation of investment
behavior are explicitly partial equilibrium in nature and have not been
developed into broader theories of the business cycle.The neoclassical
approach is compatible with some aspects of monetarism, since insta-
bility in investment can originate from government control over interest
rates and investment tax incentives.But the policy implications differ
from those of monetarism; to the extent that the monetarist recommenda-
tion of a constant monetary growth rate rule would increase the vola-
tility of interest rates, then the neoclassicists would predict the
consequence to be greater rather than lesser fluctuations in investment
spending.The "Q'advocateshave not addressed themselves to business4
cycle implications, but their approach creates a natural link to those
(like Mishkln, (1978)) who emphasize the role of the 1929 stock market
crash in the Great Depression.
The conflict between the Keynesian and monetarist approaches can be
related to the distinction in business cycle analysis between "impulses"
and "propagation mechanisms."Keynesians argue for activist monetary
and fiscal policy responses to counter serially correlated investment
impulses, while monetarists view investment as part of the propagation
mechanism that carries the influence of autonomous money—supply impulses
from their origin in the government sector to their effect on private—
sector spending.'The Keynesian—monetarist debate can be translated
into the modern econometric language of Granger causality and innovation
accounting.Keynesians would expect to find a large role for "own
innovations" in the empirical explanation of investment spending, with a
relatively small role for feedback from monetary variables.An extreme
Keynesian would expect investment to be exogenous in the Granger sense
to prior changes in the money supply, and the same expectation would be
held by neoclassicists and Qadvocates,none of whom (to our knowledge)
has ever entered the money supply directly as an explanatory variable in
an empirical investment equation.Monetarists, of course, would expect
to find that the money supply is Granger causally prior to fixed
investment.
This paper reopens the question of exogeneity in investment beha-
vior by inquiring whether the standard approach to the estimation of
"structuralinvestment equations leads to an overstatement of the
endogeneity of investment spending.Its primary objective is to decom-
pose fluctuations in fixed investment into three components,(a) feed—5
back from policy variables and from non—investment spending, (b) the
propagation mechanism imparted by the investment process itself, which
displays a high degree of positive serial correlation, and (c) "own
innovations' or "shocks" in fixed investment expenditures that remain
after accounting for (a) and (b).The main contributions of the paper
can be divided into three categories——methodological, data creation, and
empirical.
The methodological section finds that, while structural model
building exercises may be useful in suggesting lists of variables that
may play an explanatory role in investment equations, they generally
achieve identification of structural parameters only by imposing
arbitrary and unbelievable simplifying assumptions and exclusion
restrictions.Consideration of real—world decision making suggests that
economic aggregates play "multiple roles" in investment behavior, which
imply that the observed coefficients on explanatory variables in
equations describing investment behavior represent a convolution of
numerous structural parameters that cannot be separately identified.As
a result itis possible only to estimate reduced forms.
The estimation methodology suggested here is the same as that
proposed in a previous paper on inflation (Gordon—King, 1982).It
starts with guidance from traditional structural models on the choice
and form of explanatoryvariables to be included.Then estimation is
carried out in a format similar to that of the unconstrained "Simsian"
VAR models.Explanatory variables are typically entered with uncon-
strained lags of the same length, and the list of explanatory variables
typically includes a mixture of those suggested by several structural
models, together with those that may not be suggested by any structural6
model but might in principle play a role through real wealth effects,
credit constraints, or expectation formation (e.g., the real money
supply).The approach differs from the usual VAR model—building exer-
cise by focussing mainly on equations for the variable of primary
interest (inflation in Gordon—King, and investment expenditures in this
paper), rather than by giving "equal time" to all of the variables in
the model.It is less "atheoretical" than most VAR research, because
structural models retain a usefulness in suggesting lists of candidate
variables to be included in reduced—form equations and the form in which
those variables should be entered (in this paper, for instance, stock
market prices enter in the form of Tobin's "Q"variable),even if the
underlying structural parameters cannot be identified.
The second contribution is the use of a new set of quarterly data
for major expenditure categories of GNP extending back to 1919.The
data file also contains quarterly data back to 1919 for other variables
that have been suggested as explanatory "candidates" in investment equa-
tions.These include the capital stock, interest rates, the cost of
capital including tax incentive effects, a proxy for Tobin's "Q",and
the real money supply.
Equipped with its hybrid methodology and its extended data set,the
paper then proceeds to empirical estimation.The empirical section
differs fromthe usual research on investment that typically attempts to
measure response parameters within the context of a single structural
theory, e.g., neoclassical or "Q".Instead,our skepticism that struc-
tural parameters can be estimated leads us to estimate reduced—form
equations.These include explanatory variables suggested by several
theories and can be used to decompose the variance of investment within7
particular historical periods among the contribution of lagged valuesof
explanatory variables (output, interest rates, money, Q),thecontri-
bution of lagged investment, and "own innovations" to investment.The
analysis of shocks to investment provides a link betwen thispaper and
the debate between Temin (1976), Thomas Mayer (1980), and otherson the
role of an autonomous shock to consumption in 1930, and topapers in
this volume by Hall on shifts in the consumption function and by
Blanchard—Watson on "shocks—in—general."Our extended data set also
allows us to investigate changes in investment behavior between the
interwar and postwar periods.
The paper begins in PartII with a review of the central issues
that lead to our choice of a reduced—form rather than structuralap-
proach.This is not a full—blown survey of the literature, but rathera
selective analysis of problems with structural estimation thathave
emerged over the past 20 years.Then Part III contains an introduction
to the data set and a description of the behavior of the major variables
in each of the 14 business cycles since 1919, as wellas over longer
subperiods.Part IV presents the estimated equations for four cate-
gories of investment (producer durable equipment, nonresidential and
residential structures, and consumer durable expenditures), and PartV
presents a study of multivariate causality and exogeneity, innovation
accounting, and a historical decomposition of the sources of investment
spending.Part VI contains a summary of the main results and
implications.8
II.PITFALLS IN STRUCTURfiJ.. ESTIMATION OF INVESTMENT EQUATIONS
Most of the investment literature is concerned solely with business
investment.This orientation reflects the influence of Keynes' General
Theory, especially its preoccupation with the state of business confi-
dence as a determinant of investment plans.However business investment
constitutes less than half of total private investment in the U. S.
economy.Consumer expenditures on durable goods have been larger than
producers' durable equipment expenditures since 1920, and residential
structures expenditures have exceeded those on nonresidential investment
in at least half the years since 1929.
One might expect household investment behavior to respond to
different variables than business investment.For instance, if a sub-
stantial fraction of consumers is credit constrained, then episodes of
"credit crunches" are liable to produce a greater response in the
investment outlays of consumers than of businessmen.2A systematic
exploration of household investment behavior may need to explore factors
that matter in household decision—making, e.g., disposable income may
matter for households but total GNP for businessmen, and the various tax
incentive terms conventionally included in measures of the user cost of
capital may matter for businessmen but not for households,Here we
begin with a critique of the more familiar literature on business
investment, and subsequently apply our analysis to the determinants of
household investment.
Chirinko's (1983a) systematic review of assumptions and results
distinguishes four classes of econometric models describing business
investment behavior——Jorgenson's neoclassical approach, Tobin's "Q",the
"General Forward—Looking" approach based on explicit modelling of9
expectations, and Feldstein's "Return—Over—Cost" and "Effective Tax
Rate" models.Because they have accounted for the vast majority of
empirical studies completed to date, we concentrate only on the neo-
classical and Qframeworksfor investment research.Extended surveys
are presented by Eisner and Strotz (1963), Jorgenson (1971), Helliwell
(1976), and Chirinko (1983a), whereas here we treat onlya few selected
issues that lead to our skepticism that traditional structural
parameters can be identified.
The Neoclassical Paradigm
As of the mid 1970s, the neoclassical paradigm was so dominant (at
least outside of New Haven) that Helliwell's (1976) survey makes no
mention of any other framework.Prior to the mid 1960s, investment
equations had been dominated by the accelerator approach and had added
interest rates, profits,or other variables as determinants of
investment without explicit constraints based on optimizing behavior.
The studies initiated by Jorgenson and collaborators, particularly
Jorgenson (1963, 1967), Hall—Jorgenson (1967, 1971), and Jorgenson—
Stephenson (1967, 1969), are distinguished by their derivation of the
desired capital—output ratio from specific assumptions about behavior
and about the form of the production function.The centerpiece in the
determination of the desired capital stock is the expected real rental
price of capital services, which is equated to the expected marginal
product of capital.If factors are paid their marginal products and the
production function is of the Cobb—Douglas form, the desired capital
stock at a given point in time (K) is a linear function of expected
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When the expected variables(e eand Ce) are replaced by current
actual values (an unjustified assumption discussed below), and when the
demand for replacement capital is represented by a fixed geometric
depreciation factor (6) times the lagged capital stock (Ki),
the neoclassical investment model becomes:
J
It
=a0 +E .A(PX/C). + 6K1+
3=0
Equation (3) embodies a number of strong assumptions and restric-
tions, and a large "counterrevolution" literature has developed to
explore the consequences of loosening them.The "pure" Jorgensonian
neoclassical approach assumes a "putty—putty'technology without adjust-
ment costs; the capital stock can be adjusted instantly, transformed,
bought, or sold as needed to bring a firm's actual capital stock into
line with its desired capital stock.As long as expectations are
assumed to be static, the only justification for the lag distribution
included in (3) is the technological gestation lag.Another inter-
pretation is that investment expenditures involve adjustment costs.ii
Withoutadjustment costs or gestation lags, the Jorgenson model is
subject to the criticism that, whenever a gap exists between and
the rate of investment will be infinitely large and the gap will be
eliminated instantaneously.However, with either of these assumptions
"tacked on,' the Jorgensonian K is not derived from a complete cost—
minimization problem and is probably not optimal.
Another peculiarity of the approach is apparent in (1), which
allows the desired capital stock to be a function only of the relative
price of capital rather than the relative price of all inputs.Yellen
(1980) has shown that (1) can be derived only by assuming that real
wages are inversely related to C/Pandrespond fully and instantaneously
to any changes in C/P.As a result all factor price changes must be
assumed to leave the profitability of the firm unaffected, even in the
short run.Thus the neoclassical approach leaves no room for theories
that predict a profit squeeze, investment slump, and growth slowdown
following a period of excessive real wage growth (see Malinvaud 1982).
However, even if one were to accept the formulation in (1) with the
single relative price variable, the measurement of capital's user cost
is fraught with ambiguity.As shown recently in Auerbach's (1983) sur-
vey, taxes and inflation may not change the cost of capital in the same
way for all firms, leaving the feasibility of aggregation an open
question.Simple formulae for C/P are also elusive when marketsare
incomplete, and when managers use financial leverage and dividend policy
to influence market perceptions.
The empirical 'counterrevolution' begins with Eisner—Nadiri (1968),
an article which takes particular exception to the multiplicative speci-
fication in (3) that forces both the short—run and long—run responses toX and C/P to be identical.Eisner—Nadiri find that the elasticities
with respect to output are considerably higher than those with respect
to relative prices, and Bischoff (1971) finds that lags are shorter on
output than on relative prices.Chirinko—Eisner (1983) find in experi-
ments with the DRI and MPSeconometricmodels that splitting apart the X
and C/P variables can cause the implicit relative price elasticity to
fall by more than half, and together with minor redefinitions of the C/P
variable can cause a reduction in that elasticity by a factor of four.
However, even by loosening restrictions in this way they find that
response coefficients to changes in the investment tax credit in six
models still vary by a factor of four (or a factor of about two for the
four most extensively used models——Chase, DRI, MPS, and Wharton).
Expectations and Identification
An even more serious problem in (1) —(3)is the cavalier treatment
of expectations, which are included in (1) but assumed to be static in
the transition from (1) to (3).In Helliwell's words, "This important
issue has been dealt with principally by the handy assumption that the
future will be like the present" (1976, p.15).At best, expectations
of future output are allowed to depend on a distributed lag of past
values of output, but generally lagged values of other variables that
might be relevant for expectations formation (e.g., the money supply)
have been excluded as an identification restriction.Since investment
is a forward—looking activity, not only must the X and C/P variables be
represented by expectations that in principle should depend on an infor-
mation set containing past values of all relevant macroeconomic aggre-
gates, but also the functional parameters entering the investment model13
should depend on the same general information set.
This point can be illustrated in a generalization of a simple model
set forth recently by Andrew Abel and Olivier Blanchard (1983), that
falls into the class of "general forward—looking models."In place of
(1) we allow the desired capital stock to depend on a sequence of
expected future sales, with a discount factor a; unlike Abel—Blanchard
we also allow the desired capital stock to depend on the sequence of
expected future rental rates (C/P):4
(4) a(l—a)a'E{{X÷+.,(C/P).]j]}.
Heretis the time an investment order is placed for delivery at t+n,
vith n the length of the delivery or gestation lag.The parameter a is
the steady—state ratio of capital to output, and is the information
set relevant at time t to the formation of expectations about all future
variables.The relevant information set might, for instance, include
past values of output, the interest rate, and the money supply.
It has been an almost universal practice in the empirical litera-
ture to express the depreciation rate of capital as a fixed exponential
constant.In contrast Eisner (1972), Feldstein and Foot (1971) and
Feldstein and Rothschild (1974) have argued that the timing of replace-
ment investment is an economic decision and is motivated by economic
considerations.In particular, fixed proportions in building or machine
construction create an enormous incentive for net investment and
replacement investment to be considered as part of the same economic
decision—making process.5Accordingly we replace the fixed replacement
rate in the Abel—Blanchard model by an expected rate (e)thatdepends on14
theinformation set:
(5) =[l_E(eIQ)]K÷i+ It+n•
where 1t+n represents investment expenditures made at time t+n (strictly
speaking this should be an expectation——see note 6 below).
Investment orders depend on the gap between desired and actual
capital that is expected to occur at time t+n, and the present expecta-
tion of the fraction of the capital stock that will be replaced at that
time.Although the fraction of the gap to be closed is decided at time
t,andis not an expected value, today's decision regarding the fraction
depends on the expected cost of adjustment during the period of the






where is a disturbance term.
Finally, actual investment expenditures (L) are a sum of past




Here in (7) for completeness we allow the coefficients to depend on
the information set, thus introducing the possibility that orders may be
cancelled before delivery or that the gestation lag is influenced by the15
evolution of the economy between time periods t—j and t.7Thusit would
appear that the Abel—Blanchard assumption thatE u. 1is unrealis—
j=O
tically restrictive.
It is obvious from inspection of (4) —(7)that in principle itis
not possible to identify structural coefficients on current and lagged
economic aggregates in an aggregate investment equation, because any of
those aggregates could be playing double, triple, or even more rolesas
ingredients in the information sets The reduced form involves
complicated convolutions of the variables entering the information set,
which appears in five places in the reduced form:
(8)
It
— —It+n_j_1I+E(el .)K÷. +
Theresearch by Abel and Blanchard (1983) provides a good example
of the arbitrary assumptions and simplifications needed to achieve
identification in a model like (4) —(7).Their problems occur despite
a much simpler framework that differs by (a) excluding the rental price
from any appearance, even in determining the desired capital stock,(b)
allowing expectations based on an information set only with regard to
the sequence of expected future output,(c) allowing only past values of
sales to be included in that information set, and (d) assuming fixed
values of all other parameters.Further, Abel and Blanchard have two
additional types of data not available in this historical study of
aggregate expenditures,(e) separate data on orders and expenditures,
and (f) sectoral data that allow a distinction to be made between aggre—16
gate and sectoral sales.Despite these differences (a) —(f),Abel and
Blanchard achieve identification of a structural model only by assuming
arbitrary fixed values of several parameters, and they find no conclu-
sive evidence to prefer the resulting structural model to the
corresponding reduced form.8
In our application to a set of aggregate data, the more general
model (4) —(7)does not appear to allow the identification of struc-
tural parameters.For instance, consider the role of interest rates and
stock prices.Both would seem to be relevant information for economic
agents forming expectations about future output, not to mention future
interest rates and stock prices (both components of the Jorgensonian
rental price).Yet how is the estimated coefficient on a lagged inter-
est rate variable to be disentangled to allow identification of separate
roles that this variable plays in forming expectations in different
places in the model in affecting the desired capital stock, in affecting
the desired rate of replacement of old capital, and in affecting the
desired rate of closing the gap between desired and actual capital?
The QApproach
The expectations quagmire is inherent in the neoclassical approach,
with its identification of key parameters requiring ad hoc exclusion
restrictions in the set of variables allowed into the information set
influencing expectations.The "pure" Qapproachdiffers from the usual
investment accelerator by explaining investment activity on the basis of
deviations from portfolio balance, and by assuming from the start that
there is no "time to build," i.e., that there are no gestation lags,so
that I= Netinvestment activity takes place when marginal Q,the17
ratio of the increase in the value of the firm from acquiring an addi-
tional unit of capital to its marginal purchase cost, exceeds unity.
Numerous authors, including Abel (1979) and Hayashi (1982), have derived
Qinvestmentfunctions in the following form that adds lags to allow for




The theoretical derivation involves "marginal Q,'whichis forward—
looking and hence unobservable.Actual estimation of (9) involves
replacing marginal Qwithaverage Q,theratio of the market value of
firms to the replacement cost of their assets.(Hayashi (1982) has
shown that actual and marginal Qareequal under specified assumptions
but does not test whether these assumptions are empirically sup—
ported.)If (9) is estimated for data on net investment, then the
constant term should be zero, since net investment should be zero in
the steady state when Qisunity.When data on gross investment are
used, then the constant term implicitly measures the depreciation
rate.At a Qratioof unity, the firm should just replace its old
capital but should not buy any new capital.More generally, the
constant term reflects the mean value of any omitted variables.
Much of the discussion of possible problems in the Qapproach
relates to measurement errors in either the numerator (market value)or
denominator (replacement cost) of the Qratio.For instance, firms may
not pay attention to every quarterly movement in securities prices,
given the possibility of excess volatility in financial markets
(Shiller, 1981).In addition Hall (1977) and Chirinko (1983b) have18
emphasized the likelihood of errors due to the indirect measurement of
the value of stocks and bonds, and to the fact that the value of a
firm's shares depends on everything owned by the corporations, not just
their physical capital but also intangible capital, natural resources,
goodwill, monopoly position, and firm—specific human capital.The
denominator of the Qratiois likely to be measured with error, because
of the absence of a complete inventory of the capital actually in place,
and the need for approximations that may ignore premature retirements
(due, for instance, to changes in energy prices), and mismeasurement of
the replacement price of capital due to inadequate adjustment for
quality change.
To date empirical results with the Qmodelhave been disappointing.
It does not perform as well in the 1970s as other alternatives (Clark,
1979), and yields a relatively low R2 even when carefully adjusted for
tax effects (Summers,1981).10One possible problem is illustrated by
the increases in energy prices after the two oil shocks of the 1980s.
These were followed by a sharp decline in the stock market and in
measured average Q,butnot by a marked decline in investment.This
might reflect a production relation in which capital and energy are
substitutes, so that a higher relative price of energy induces new
capital investment.
Similarly, an episode of "wage push" that increases the share of
labor on a semi—permanent basis could well reduce the Qratiofor a long
time by depressing the numerator much faster than the denominator can
adjust.Recall that the denominator is the replacement cost of capital,
measured as today's capital goods price index times a perpetual inven-
tory measure of the real capital stock.If the inflation rate is larger19
than the retirement rate, the denominator of the Qratiocan grow while
the numerator is falling.A decline in the stock market can occur when
higher prices of labor or energy eliminate the profit earned by old
plants, but nevertheless firms may keep operating these plants as long
as they contribute more to cash flow than to variable cost (recent
examples include dinosaur steel plants recently closed by U.S. Steel or
the 707s finally grounded by TWA four years after the second oil shock).
Even if Qcouldsomehow be measured accurately, with a correct
measure of capital actually in place used to calculate the denominator
of the Qratio,empirical tests of the theory would run aground on a
basic asymmetry in adjustment costs and gestation lags that seems to
have been ignored.An increase in Qaboveunity should induce positive
net investment limited only by the size of adjustment costs and delivery
lags, but a decrease in Qbelowunity induces negative net investment
subject to a quite different set of adjustment costs.Firms may not
retire capital until its cash flow falls to its variable cost, and there
may be a long transition period that brings with it the danger of bank-
ruptcy before this variable cost point is actually reached.Firms with
little profit—making potential and with a near—zero value on the stock
market may nonetheless have sufficient residual goodwill or monopoly
power to be able to keep themselves afloat by issuing debt, as has been
so evident in the airline industry.An implication is that a revival of
industry fortunes (due, for instance, to a decline in energy prices) may
cause stock prices to soar without setting off an investoent boom, as
firms concentrate on paying off debt and restructuring their balance
sheets.
Such portfolio rearrangements can create considerable looseness20
between stock market movements and investment decisions.The same
looseness may be caused in part by a differing evaluation of a company's
future formed by firm management from that formed by the market.In
graduate school we were first exposed to Paul Samuelson's joke that "the
stock market has predicted nine out of the last five recessions," and we
also have heard much from 0dig1iani—Cohn (1979) and others about irra-
tionality in market valuations.So it seems no wonder that management
should be as skeptical of the market's verdict in making valuations as
we economists have been.In a recent survey of 600 companies, Business
Week found that 60 percent of responding executives felt that the "real
value" of their company was undervalued by the stock market."
Our criticism of the Qtheoryhas been based on asymmetric adjust—
ment costs and possible irrationality or differences in opinion in
market valuations.It is related to the critique by Bosworth (1975),
which stresses that firms will pay little attention to Q,becausethe
stock market fluctuates excessively, while investment projects take time
to plan and construct.Bosworth's argument is criticized by Fischer and
Merton (1984), who deny that managers would ignore the stock market even
when granting Bosworth the extreme assumptions that (a) there occurs a
completely exogenous and irrational decline in the stock market (with an
accompanying increase in the expected return on the stock market from 15
to 20 percent) while (b) firm managers' assessments are "completely
unaffected by such animal spirits and they know with certainty the true
objective probabilities" (that the expected equilibrium real return is
15 percent) (p. 39).Even in such a situation, Fischer and Merton
argue, the stock market would influence investment, since rational
managers would use retained earnings to purchase their own or other21
firms' shares.Similarly, they would be reluctant to finance new
investments by issuing equity at the depressed stock market prices.
No doubt some firms are influenced by such considerations.
However, others may forge ahead with new investment projects, forat
least two reasons.First, animal spirits may influence the stock and
bond markets differently.The 1973—75 episode of collapsing stock
market was accompanied by negative short—term ex post real interest
rates and by long—term real bond rates that were relatively low, judged
either in terms of the high contemporaneous inflation rate of 1974—75or
by the average inflation rate of the 1974—81 period viewedretrospec-
tively.Thus firms may simply have switched from equity to debt issue.
Fischer and Merton would contend that rational managers should have
borrowed short—term to buy back their shares instead of planningnew
investment projects, but their view seems to ignore the potentially
large costs of postponing investment projects.
Managers face a tradeoff between the uncertain capital gains to be
made on purchase and subsequent resale of their own sharesor those of
other firms, and the less uncertain losses that would be incurred if
(given long lead times and gestation lags) new capacitywere not
constructed now in anticipation of the next period of prosperity and
high capacity utilization.The planning and implementation of invest-
ment in new plant and equipment may be an ongoing bureaucraticprocess
involving high costs of delay or postponement.
Surely the real world is characterized by both responses, withsome
firms responding to a stock market slump that they believe to be tern—
porary by choosing the buy—back route, while others engage in friendly
or hostile take—over bids, and still others continuing with previously22
planned investment projects.Fischer and Merton may argue correctly
that the stock market must make some difference to investment expendi-
tures, while we put forth the compatible argument that the stock market
may be used as just one piece of information, in addition to the
traditional factors (expected output, rental prices, etc.).If this is
a correct interpretation, then the Qmodel,by including only the single
Qvariable,as in (9), incorporates arbitrary exclusion restrictions,
just as does the neoclassical paradigm.When we incorporate looser
restrictions into both approaches, they melt together into a generalized
reduced form in which output, interest rates, stock prices, the money
supply, tax rates, and other variables enter a model like (4) —(7)in
multiple roles, influencing desired capital, expectations, desired
adjustment speeds, and replacement rates.
Household Investment
Household investment in durable goods and residential structures
has received much less attention than business investment in equipment
andstructures.'2This neglect cannot be justified by the share of
household fixed investment in GNP, as this share has been at least as
large as that of business investment throughout the 1919—83 period and
has become relatively larger in the past two decades.Perhaps it is the
perception that household investment is passive rather than a driving
force in business cycles that has kept it in the background.Expendi-
tures on consumer durables and residential structures, rather than being
treated on a par with business investment, enter into macroeconomic
model building mainly as a channel of transmission of monetary policy
episodes of disintermediation and credit controls.23
There are many parallels between the models used for consumer
expenditure and those used to explain business investment.Both the
simple Keynesian consumption—income relation and Friedman's permanent
income hypothesis are close analogues to certain variants of the
accelerator hypothesis of business investment behavior.Lagged or
expected GNP is replaced as an explanatory variable by lagged or expec-
ted disposable income in moving from business to consumer investment,
but the mechanism remains the same.More recent attempts at modeling
the consumer's decision, such as Bernanke (1982), treat optimal durable
goods investment within the framework of intertemporal utility maximiza-
tion under uncertainty.The resulting model parallels closely the
"business investment in the presence of adjustment costs" literature
that originated with Lucas (1967).All models like Bernanke's either
implicitly or explicitly require consumers to form expectations of
future values of relevant variables, leading to the same complications
(delivery lags, replacement timing) that occur for business investment
above in equation (8).As is the case in (8), the estimated coeffi-
cients of the relevant time—serf es variables are under—identified
convolutions of many structural parameters.
Relation to Other Critiques
Christopher Sims (1980a) presented a critique of traditional econo-
metric models and urged the profession to shift from structural estima-
tion to his atheoretical VARs.In a sense the above critique of
structural investment equations represents a special case of Sims' more
general critique.Both place particular emphasis on the fact that any
set of lagged variables may in principle influence expectations of a24
variable, and thus there is little justification for many of the exclu-
sion restrictions that are incorporated in traditional econometric
models.For instance, there is ample evidence that it is suboptimal to
form expectations of real output using only a univariate autoregression,
as in most empirical implementations of the neoclassical investment
model and in such recent papers as Abel—Blanchard (1983).In
contrast, our own recent work (Gordon, 1983b) shows that nominal GNP
growth is associated with past changes in interest rates, the monetary
base, and the money multiplier, with different weights in each postwar
decade.And in another paper (1982) we showed that, for a given nominal
GNP change, real output depends among other things on its own lagged
value, lagged inflation, lagged changes in real energy prices, and
variables to capture the effects of government price—control programs.
Despite the above critique of traditional investment equations and
its similarity to Sims' general critique, there is no need to go as far
as Sims in endorsing completely atheoretical VAR models.Consideration
of a reduced—form equation like (8), together with the long list of
candidate variables that might influence expectations, suggests that
degrees of freedom are likely to be exhausted even in a relatively large
data set like that used in this paper.VAR models estimated to date
usually involve short lists of aggregate variables without inclusion of
individual categories of expenditure, e.g., investment, or special
variables that might be important for a particular category.
Gordon and King (1982) recommend an econometric approach that
combines the VAR approach with the estimation of reduced—form equations
suggested by traditional theory.Both the reduced—form and VAR ap—
proaches can be viewed as selecting different methods of allocating zero25
restrictions in the face of scarce degrees of freedom.Like any trade-
off in economics, the best way to allocate these restrictions should
depend on an assessment of benefits and costs.The VAR technique,in
which every variable is included on the right—hand side of every
equation with lag distributions of equal length,is a useful tool for
checking traditional specifications and determining, for instance,
whether stock prices or the money supply "belong" in an investment
equation.To repeat a phrase frequently used in oral discussions by
Sims, Shiller, and others, the VAR technique is an efficient way to
conduct "exploratory data analysis."
But reduced—form econometrics must be guided by prior structural
analysis.Excessive pursuit of symmetry in the VAR approach can lead an
investigator to omit particular variables that may matter for one equa-
tion but not others, e.g., variables to measure the effect of the
wartime price controls in a study of inflation, or the investment tax
credit in a study of investment behavior.Gordon and King (and in more
detail King, 1983) have concluded that specifications used in some VAR
applications have been cavalier about detrending and have tended to
yield estimates that mix secular and cyclical effects and can result in
biased coefficients.
The general Simsian critique, and our particular critique of the
investment literature, seem to point to estimation of highly unrestric-
ted and unconstrained specifications.They appear to move in the
opposite direction from econometric work set in motion by the Lucas
(1976) critique, which has set out on the task of estimating parameters
"at deep levels of choice," e.g., parameters of utility and production
functions, that remain invariant in the face of changes in policy rules.26
As yet this line of research, represented for instance by Hansen and
singleton (1982), has not yet provided convincing time—series charac-
terizations of the major macroeconomic variables that might be compared
with traditional explanations.Further, applications of the Hansen—
Singleton methodology appear to achieve "identification via an
'incredible' disturbance assumption," according to a recent critique by
Peter Garber and Robert King (1983).
The Hybrid Methodology:Blending Structure with VAR Reduced Forms
The central role of investment fluctuations in business cycles has
spawned an enormous number of papers that estimate structural investment
equations in which unconvincing simplifications and exclusion restric-
tions have been introduced to achieve identification.Often the focus
is on persuading the reader that the author's favorite explanatory
variable is statistically significant, or that some other author's
favorite variable is insignificant.Our skepticism regarding the
multiple roles played by aggregate time series variables, and our doubt
that any proxy for Tobin's "Q"canadequately summarize all of the
influences on investment appropriations and expenditures, leads us to
estimate reduced form equations.Our point of departure is a list of
"candidate" explanatory variables that has been suggested in previous
theoretical research.Our basic emphasis is on determining which varia-
bles play an important role in the investment process, and how much of
the variance of investment remains to be attributed to "innovations."
The methodological approach adopted here is similar to that pre-
viously applied to the econometric explanation of inflation behavior.
This line of research has proven fruitful in developing an inflation27
equation that over the postwar period appears to remain relatively
stable and which, when estimated for the pre—1981 period, seems able to
track reasonably well the sharp disinflation that has occurred since
then.'4Insights of previous structural models are used to develop the
list of explanatory variables, and to emerge with a specification that
introduces a few more constraints than typically appear in "pure" VAR
models.The equation can be used to test for the exogeneity of parti-
cular sets of lagged variables in the inflation process, for temporal
stability, and for biases in one set of coefficients that results from
the omission of another variable.They can be used to identify signi-
ficant shifts in sets of lagged coefficients between one period and
another.However, what has been lost in the inflation equation litera-
ture, and what cannot be regained, is the ability to use particular
coefficients to identify specific aspects of the behavior of labor
markets as opposed to product markets.'5
The specification of the investment equation in this paper begins
with the lagged dependent variable.Just as we are interested in
"inflation inertia," we are interested in "investment inertia."The
serial correlation properties of the investment process, which result at
least in part from aggregation over heterogeneous projects having
different gestation lags, are part of the basic "propagation mechanism"
by which random shocks in the demand for investment goods are translated
into business cycles displaying persistence in the devfation of output
fromtrend.Most previous econometric work on investment, whether based
on a neoclassical specification like (3) or a "Q"specificationlike
(9), has omitted the lagged dependent variable.If the "true" invest-
ment process exhibits a high degree of positive serial correlation, then28
estimated coefficients are likely to be biased when the lagged dependent
variable is omitted.Although we exhibit evidence of the effects of
this misspeciflcation below, the nature of the bias can be illustrated
in the following simple model.Imagine that the true model of
investment spending (In) involves both an accelerator effect on the




while the misspecified regression that is actually estimated is:
(11) It =bAXi+Ut.
By the usual analysis of specification error in the case of a left—out
variable, we can write the expectation of the estimated accelerator
coefficient as:
(12) E(b)= +
wherey is the coefficient of the 'auxiliary" regression of lagged
investment on the lagged change in output.Since investment is part of
output, there is a presumption that y is positive, although a precise
expression for y requires a more complete specification of the time—
series process generating non—investment output.A full analysis of
this problem would also need to take account of the fact that most
empirical accelerator equations include a set of current and several
lagged X terms.It is sufficient here to note simply that tests of the
accelerator hypothesis may yield biased coefficients, as in (12), and
that the error term in (11) is quite likely to exhibit serial correla—29
tion,since it is related to the "true" error terme as follows:
(13)u =e+p[(l—y)I
+ —
whereN is non—investment output.
The listof. regressors for our investment equations, in addition to
the lagged dependent variable, begins with the two central variables in
the neoclassical approach, the change in output and in the real price of
capital services (C/P).Tobin'sQisincluded as well, in combination
with the neoclassical variables rather than alone as in (9).Because
changes in the money stock may be relevant both for the formation of
expectations and/or as a proxy for the effect of credit rationing, these
are included as well.The most important variables that are omitted are
the prices of other inputs besides capital, e.g., the real wage and real
energy prices.This omission is justified by the need to control the
scale of this empirical investigation, which tends to grow with the
square of the explanatory variables considered as candidates.
The empirical equations share with the VAR approach the use of
unconstrained and relatively short lag distributions, and the inclusion
of the same number of lags for each explanatory variable, including the
lagged dependent variable.In our initial research, as in much other
recent VAR research, lag distributions were limited to four quarters.
Subsequently we adjusted the lag length to eight quarters for the
postwar period, in light of the evidence that the coefficient on the
price of capital services for the postwar period is sensitive to an
extension of lag length.Contemporaneous values of variables are
excluded from the estimated regressions.Subsequently we examine
correlations among contemporaneous orthogonalized innovations in a VAR30
model containing equations for investment and for each of our final set
of explanatory variables.At that stage we carry out several "innova-
tion accounting" exercises for two alternative choices of the ordering
of contemporaneous errors in the VAR system.As shown by Gordon and
King (1982, pp. 212—14), such choices amount to decisions about
admitting current variables into the estimating equations.
The specification of the investment equations in this paper differs
from most applications of the VAR technique in its correction for
heteroscedasticity and in its attention to the form of variables.All
real expenditure series are normalized by "natural real GNP" (XN).The
money supply is expressed in real terms, since itis entered into an
equation for real investment expenditures, and it is also normalized by
xN.Our empirical tests also examine shifts in coefficients over time.
The precise values of the individual lag coefficients are of no particu-
lar interest.Instead, we emphasize exclusion tests on the contribution
of all lags of a given right—hand variable, running these tests for both
the interwar and postwar period.This technique allows us to determine
whether the relative contribution of different sets of variables has
changed over time.There is no analogy in the paper to the usual search
for significant coefficients, since either positive or negative results
in the exclusion tests are equally interesting.
III.DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Development of the Basic Variables
This paper investigates the historical behavior of four categories
of fixed investment:producers' durable equipment (PDE), nonresidential
structures (NRS), residential structures (RS), and consumer durable31
expenditures (CD).While in the previous literature some of these cate-
gories have been analyzed with different theories in separate papers,
here they all seem amenable to analysis within the same reduced—form
methodology.Our inclusion of consumer durable expenditures as part of
"investment" creates an overlap in coverage with Hall's paper in this
volume.
Quarterly data on the four investment categories for 1947—83 come
from the National Income and Product Accounts.Investment and real GNP
data for 1919—41 are created by the Chow and Lin (1971) method of inter-
polation from a variety of sources, as described in the data appendix.
We have been careful to interpolate each component of real GNP on the
basis of separate data sources, in order to avoid a spurious correlation
between dependent and explanatory variables in this study.The Chow—Lin
method is an iterative procedure in which a regression is run to explain
a data series available only annually (e.g., real GNP), using as explan-
atory variables the annual average of one or more series available
monthly (e.g., industrial production and real retail sales).In this
example the coefficients from the regression are used to create monthly
(or in our case quarterly) values for real GNP.
Some investigators have carried out historical studies with raw
monthly data rather than interpolated data.Examples include Bernanke
(1983b), Sims (1980b), and the papers in this volume by Bernanke/Powell
and Blinder/HoltzEakin.This makes sense when comparable monthly data
are available for both the interwar and postwar periods.However,
investigators of postwar investment behavior have uniformly used
national accounts quarterly data, not monthly data on the industrial
production of producers durables and on square feet of nonresidential32
construction.To achieve comparability in a study of investment,
interpolated quarterly data for the interwar period arepreferable.
Further, to use the raw monthly data would involvediscarding the
information available in the annual averages for componentsof real
GNP.It seems clear from the literature thatthe previous absence of
quarterly investment expenditure data for the interwarperiod has caused
investigators to limit themselves to the postwarperiod, and it is to be
hoped that the availability of the new data setwill spur further
historical research on investment and other componentsof real GNP.
All expenditure series, real GNP, the realcapital stock, and the
real money supply are deflated by thenatural real GNP(XN)series,
the creation of which is described inGordon (1984a, Appendix C).The
basic procedure is to establish a constant"natural rate of unemploy-
ment" for the portion of the labor force not engaged asself—employed
farmers and proprietors——this natural rateis arbitrarily set equal to
the rate estimated for 1954 in a study ofinflation dynamics covering
the 1954—80 period.Then, adjusting for the shrinking shareof self—
employed proprietors (who are not counted among theunemployed), the
corresponding total natural unemployment rate series isused to estab-
lish the level of in selected benchmark years (1901, 1912, 1923,
1929, 1949, and 1954).Since actual and natural unemployment are not
equal in the benchmark years, an assumed "Okun's Lawcoefficient of 2.0
was used in calculating for those years, and the values for inter-
vening years were interpolated using logarithms.The deflation by is
introduced to avoid heteroscedasticitythe level of rises from $229
billion in 1919 to $1667 billion in 1983.Use of theXNseries is
superior to detrending in a study of businesscycles, since detrending33
for a period like 1929—41 yields an unrealistically low estimate of
"normal" conditions.
In addition to data on investment expenditures, thisstudy has
developed five other series as possible explanatory variables.All are
from original sources, and only the capital stock is interpolated.The
others are available monthly.
(1)Capital stock.This is available as an annual series from
the Commerce Department capital stock study for both producers durable
equipment and nonresidential structures.Four concepts are available,
gross and net, in current and constant dollars.In this study the net
real stock is interpolated quarterly (as described in the data
appendix).It is used and subsequently rejected as an explanatory
variable, and the net real stock times the current investment price
deflator isused as an estimate of the replacement cost of capital for
construction of the'Qproxy"described below.
(2)Real Money Supply and Real Monetary Base.The "High
Powered Money" series is from Friedman—Schwartz (1970), divided by the
interpolated GNP deflator, and linked to the corresponding postwar
series.The Ml series has been created by Benjamin Friedman back to
1915 on a basis that is consistent with the current (early 1980s)
definition.
(3)"Average Q'.Firsta "QProxy"series is calculated as an
index number, with 1972:Q2 1.0, since the numerator and denominator
are in different units.The numerator is the Standard and Poors 500
stock price index, and the denominator is the replacement—cost net
capital stock index described above.This quarterly series is used to
interpolate Summers' annual average "conventional Q"series(1981, Table34
3, column 1) for the period 1931—1979.Data for 1919—30 and 1980—83 are
obtained by linking "QProxy"to the interpolated Summers series in 1931
and 1980.
(4)Real Interest Rate.The expected inflation rate used to
calculate the real interest rate is typically computed as the predicted
value from a simple time—series regression including lagged inflation
and a few other lagged variables.Invariably this leads to a predicted
series in which the main weight is carried by the first lag on infla-
tion, and the result is a highly volatile estimate of the expected
inflation rate and the corresponding expected real interest rate
relevant for investment decisions.In this study the volatile series
produced by this procedure is ignored, and in its place we use a twelve—
quarter "rectangular" weighted average of past inflation.Even this
arbitrary approximation is flawed, however, because it gives unreason-
able values in periods for the first few years after both World War I
and World War II.As one of us has argued previously (1973), rational
agents would have treated wars and immediate postwar periods as special
episodes, in light of a long history of wartime inflation and postwar
deflation.Since there was no trend in prices over the century before
World War I,an expected inflation rate of zero is imposed for the
interval 1919—24, and the twelve—quarter average is introduced beginning
in 1925:Q1.After World War II the same procedure is used for 1947—49,
except that the constant value is set equal to 2.6 percent, the value of
the twelve—quarter average in 1950:Q1.This series on expected infla-
tion is subtracted from the Baa rate,to reflect the presumed relevance
of a less—than—highest—grade interest rate for the average investment
decision.35
(5)The Real Price of Capital Services (C/P).Standard
formulae, shown in the appendix, are used to calculate the realprice of
capital services from a variety of data sources.The before—tax real
borrowing rate is taken to be the real Baa rate, from (4) above.This
facilitates comparisons of the effects ofthe full C/P variable as con-
trasted with that of the real Baa rate, one of the major components of
C/P.The depreciation rate included in the estimate of C/P is that
which is yielded by an iterative search for the rate that makes the
quarterly interpolated capital stock series in (1) above consistent with
the published annual capital stock series and our new interpolated
quarterly investment series.Tax rates are obtained from published
sources, as described in the appendix.
Fixed Investment in Recessions, 1920—1982
Descriptive statistics on the variables used in this paper are
provided in Tables 1,2, and 3.The first of these calculates the
percentage decline in three ratios to over the 13 recessions in our
sample period, five in the interwar period and eight in the postwar
period.NBER reference cycles are used throughout, and this creates an
inconsistency between the cycle dating procedure actually used (see the
chronology paper by Moore—Zarnowitz in this volume) and the "growth
cycleconcept that would be more relevant given our deflation of real
variables byxN.
Column(1) of Table1shows the percentage decline in the "output
ratio" X/XN, ranging from 42.8 percent in 1929—33 to only 2.7percent in
1960—61.The next three columns exhibit recession declines in the ratio
of three different investment magnitudes to X——all four types of3 5A
TABLE 1
Peak to Trough Decline in
Ratios to Natural Real GP, in percent
Thirteen Business Cycles, 1920—82
PercentDecline Share of Total Elasticities
FourPOE CD FourPDE CD FourPDE CD
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expenditure,the two "business" types (PDE+NRS), and the two "household"
types (.TRS+CD),respectively.Leaving aside the mammoth numbers for
1929—33, the largest absolute declines in total investmentwere in the
recessions of 1920—21, 1937—38, and 1973—75, in that order.
The remaining columns of Table1establish the importance of fixed
investment behavior as a contributing factor in businesscycles.Shown
for each cycle is the percent of the total decline in the x/xNratio
accounted for by the decline in the ratio of total investmenttoxN.
Whilethesepercentages are quite small for the first two postwar
recessions, in other recessions they range from 30 to 78percent, with
the recessions in which investment played the largest role rankedas
1920—21, 1960—61, and 1980.Interestingly, the relative contribution of
investment to the Great Contraction of 1929—33 was less than in all five
of the postwar recessions between 1957—58 and 1980.There seems to be
no systematic difference between the interwar and postwar recessions in
the division of the investment decline between the two business types
and the two household types.The two business types accounted for a
larger contribution in eight of the 13 recessions, and thetwo household
types for the remainder.
The three right—hand columns display an elasticity concept,
measured as the percentage change in the ratios shown in columns (5)
through (7) divided by the average value of each ratio in the peak
quarter of each cycle.An elasticity of unity would indicate that the
decline in investment was proportional to its peak—quarter share, i.e.,
that the percentage responses of investment and non—investmentwere
equal.An elasticity above unity indicates that the contribution of
investment to the decline in real GNPwaslarger than its peak—quarter37
share in real GNP, and that the contribution of non—investment must have
been smaller.For all four types of investment (column 8), the elasti-
cities range from 0.6 to 3.8.The elasticity for the Great Contraction
is a middle—ranked 1.8, less than in the 1920—21, 1923—24, and 1937—38
interwar recessions, and all five of the recessions between 1957—58 and
1980.At least one example with a low elasticity can be easily
explained, the 1953—54 recession in which the dominant depressing
influence on real CNP was the post—Korea decline in defense spending.
And the relatively high elasticity of household investment In 1980 may
reflect the Influence of the Carter credit controls.
Means and Standard Deviations
Table 2 displays means and standard deviations of the variables
used in this paper over thirteen complete trough—to—trough business
cycles between 1919 and 1982, and one incomplete cycle between 1938 and
1941.Also shown are averages for the entire interwar period and
postwar period.Each cell shows the mean, with the associated standard
deviation displayed immediately below in parentheses.The first column
shows that on average thex/xNratiowas considerably higher In the
postwar period than the interwar period, and of this 10.3 percentage
point difference, 5.2 points are accounted for by the four investment
types taken together.Also evident is the much higher standard deviaton
of the X/X' and the total real investment series during the interwar
period over individual cycles.The regression equations in the subse-
quent tables of results cover several business cycles in each sub—sample
period, and this implies that regression coefficients depend not just on
the quarter—to—quarter variance of the investment series, but also on37A
TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Basic Variables
a) Statistics cover quarters
b) through 1941:03 only.
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changes in means across cycles.
In this light itis interesting to note the high means for both
types of structures investment that reflect the construction boom of the
1920s, which plays a large role in some nonmonetary explanations of the
Great Depression (see Gordon—Wilcox, 1981) and in our analysis below in
Part V.The ratios to of nonresidential structures were higher in
the 1921, 1924, and 1927 cycles than in any postwar cycle.The mean for
the 1924 cycle was highest for residential construction, followed by
1949 and a tie between 1921 and 1954.The ratios toxNof producers'
durable equipment and consumer durables show quite a different pattern,
with all three of the highest ratios achieved during the 1971—82 period.
Another difference between the two structures types and the two
equipment types concerns the difference between the interwar and postwar
standard deviations.The standard deviations of nonresidential and
residential structures fell from 2.4 to 0.5 and 1.6 to 0.8 points,
respectively.The standard deviations of producers and consumer dura—
bles fell much less, from 1.4 to 0.9 and 1.3 to 1.1.,respectively.
While nonresidential structures had by far the highest standard devia-
tion in the interwar years, consumer durables had the highest standard
deviation in the postwar years.
Additional insight into the behavior of investment spending is
provided by Figures 1and 2.The former displays real GNP (X), total
investment (I), and non—investment GNP (N), each expressed as a ratio to
XN.Here we note the contrast between the volatility of I in the 1920—
21 recession and subsequent recovery, and its relative stability during
1923—29.Evident throughout the interwar period is the high positive






















































































































































































































































andlower frequencies and is not an artifact of our interpolation
procedure.The postwar period is dominated by the large bulge in N
during the Korean war, although there is a less pronounced hump in I in
1972—74.Also evident is the downward drift in both X and N relativeto
I after 1966.The robust health of the i/xNratioin the last half of
the l970s suggests the possibility that our average Qvariablemay
perform poorly, in light of its collapse after 1973.
Figure 2 exhibits each of the four categories of investment, also
expressed as a ratio toxN.Theinvestment boom of the 1920s and the
unusual share of boom contributed by nonresidential structuresare
clearly visible.The 1930s are characterized by a simultaneous collapse
in all four categories, as well as by a milder slump of consumer durable
spending.By 1939—40, the two equipment categories had each recovered
to within a percentage point of the 1926—29 average, but residential
structures had only recovered to about half of the 1926—29 level, and
nonresidential structures to less than one—third.Postwar business
cycles exhibit a continuing shift from structures to equipment, together
with a general tendency for booms in residential structures to lead
booms in PDE, with consumer durables in between.Cycles in nonresiden-
tial structures do not coincide with those in the other four categories,
with the appearance of a process involving much longer lags.
Table 2 exhibits the means and standard deviations of the major
explanatory variables——the real money stock expressed as a ratio to
the price of capital services, average Q,andthe real Baa rate.The
behavior of these variables is illustrated in Figure 3, where each is
expressed as an index with l9l9:Q1 =1.0.The most stable variable in
both the interwar and postwar periods was real Ml, the variation of40
which consists of a slight uptrend at the end of the 1930s and a
consistent downtrend during the postwar period.The standard deviation
of real Ml is smaller than that of total investment within most interwar
cycles and is about the same order of magnitude during postwar cycles.
The capital service price has a small standard deviation and little
drift.It exhibits two major humps, in response to high real interest
rates in 1930—34 and 1980—83.The smaller degree of volatility in the
capital service price than in the real interest rate reflects the
dominant role in the former variable of a fixed depreciation rate.Both
the service price and the real interest rate exhibit minima in 1936—37,
1952—53, and 1975—77, reflecting 'price increases that are subtracted
from the nominal Baa rate.The average Qvariable(expressed as a
percent in Table 2) has a much higher mean in the interwar period than
in the postwar.The standard deviation of Qaveragedover the interwar
period was double that in the postwar, and the average for individual
cycles in the interwar period was more than four times higher than the
average for individual postwar cycles.
The regression analysis in the next part of the paper compares the
differing relative contributions of lagged investment and lagged GNP in
explaining current investment.As a preliminary, we present a decompo-
sition of variance of the ratios to of real GNP (X), real investment
(I), and real non—investment CNP (N).A familiar formula linking the
variancesof these three variables is:
(14) var(X)=var(I)+ var(N) +2cov(I,N)
Thetop half of Table 3 presents a decomposition of variance as in (12)



























































































































































Real GNP, Investment, and Non—Investment,
Ratios to Natural Real GNP in Percent
1919:Q1 1947:Q1 l966:Q1 l947:Q1
—1941:Q3 —1965:Q4 —l983:Q4 —l983:Q4
Total Real GNP
Var (X) 157.4 7.3 15.8 12.0
Var (I) 38.9 2.0 2.2 3.2
Var (N) 45.7 4.9 10.6 11.2
2 Covar (I, N) 72.8 0.4 3.0 —2.4
Var (1)/VAR (K) 0.25 0.27 0.14 0.27
VAR (N)/Var (X) 0.29 0.67 0.67 0.93
Four Types I
Var (I) 38.9 2.0 2.2 3.2
Var (PDE) 2.0 0.4 0.3 0.9
Var (RS) 2.7 0.3 0.6 0.6
Var (NRS) 5.7 0.1 0.3 0.2
Var (CD) 1.6 0.4 0.4 1.4
Residual
Covariance Terms 26.9 0.8 0.6 0.141
The bottom half of the table exhibits a parallel decomposition for the
four components of total investment.
The enormous decline in the variance of all components in the
postwar period is immediately apparent.There is no decline, however,
in the ratio var(I)/var(X), which is slightly higher in 1947—65 and
1947—83 than in 1919—41.The most interesting contrast between the
interwar and postwar period is in the covariance term.The positive
covariance between I and N contributes almost half of the total variance
of real CNP in 1919—41, whereas it contributes a negligible fraction in
1947—65 and is actually negative in the postwar period taken as a whole.
One may conjecture that, while the interwar period was dominated by the
cyclical behavior of private spending, much of the variance of non—
investment in the postwar period was contributed by government spending.
The negative covariance of I and N in the postwar may suggest that
investment was "crowded out" by major increases in government spending.
The bottom half of the table shows that about two—thirds of the
total variance of investment in the interwar period was contributed by
the covariance term, i.e., a shock common to all investment types rather
than to only one.In the two halves of the postwar the covariance terms
contribute less than half, and virtually nothing for the postwar period
taken as a whole.The largest "own—variance" in the full postwar period
is for consumer durables, but the smaller value of this term for the two
separate halves of the postwar indicates the dominance of a trend
effect.Nonresidential structures shifted from contributing the largest own—
variance in the interwar period to the smallest in the postwar period.42
IV.REGRESSIONEQUATIONS EXPLAINING TOTAL INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES
Will the Real Accelerator Please Stand Up?
The starting point of our hybrid methodology is to determine the
specification for a reduced form investment equation that seems "reason—
able" on an a priori basis.Our goal is then to use the estimated
reduced form equations to suggest "data—coherent" ways of moving to more
structural models and interpretations.In arriving at such interpreta-
tions, we recognize the conventional wisdom that many structural models
may imply the same reduced form.However, there is a similar problem
with structural models.Quite dissimilar "structural" models mayresult
when the same general economic phenomenon is interpreted by different
authors.
For example, a starting point in many studies of investment
behavior, and an ending point in some,is the accelerator hypothesis.
In its simplest form, dating back to Clark (1917), it explains the level
of real investment as a function of the change in real GNP.But this
apparently straightforward idea does not imply a single "structural"
specification.The change in real GNPmayenter only as a current
value, or as a combination of current and lagged values.Or the
investigation may start from the "flexible accelerator" hypothesis, in
which investment depends on the current level of output and one lagged
value of the capital stock.Or one might adopt a more general dynamic
specification, as in Table 4 below, that allows several lagged values of
investment to enter as well as current and lagged changes in output.
Since the coefficient on lagged investment turns out to be roughly
unity, this last alternative amounts to a regression explaining theTABLE 4
Equations for Business Investment,
Interwar and Postwar Sample Periods
ExplanatoryLaggedVariables
R2 S.E.E.D—W I tN MN AC/P LQ mL,B/PB/Ptm





2. .96*** —.06 —.09 .93 .34
3. .92w .14**.01*.36*** •57*** .96 .28
*** *** ***
4• •93*** —.14 .01* .27*** •34*** .95 .29
* ***
Non—ResidentialStructures
1. .56 .09 —.19 2.70 .048
2. .98***.09 —.07 .96 .51
3. ,93*** .30 .17—.00 .12 .96 .48
***




1. .07 —.25 —.11 1.03 .057
2. .98***.08 _.27*** .95 .21
***
3. 1.00*** .51*** _.22**.02 •39**.55***.96 .19
*** *** **
Non—ResidentialStructures
1. .30** .30* —.02 .486 .066
2. •97***.01 —.04 .96 .098
3. .98*** .02 —.01.01*** .06 .20***.97 .085
*
Notes:Numbers shown in each cell are sums of coefficientsand asterisks
next to these numbers indicate significance levels of the sums (* for
10 percent for 5 percent, and ***for1 percent).Asterisks below
the numbers indicate with the same notation the joint significance of
all lags in an exclusion test.All equations include, in addition to
the listed variables, a constant term.Purhin—Watson statistics are
not shown for equations containing lagged dependent variables.43
change of investment spending, in which case the accelerator hypothesis
would call for the output variable to enter as a second difference.A
rational expectations approach to the accelerator, as in Abel—Blanchard
(1983), would imply a reduced form in which levels of expected future
output appear, rather than lagged values.These expectations maybe
functions of many variables in addition to lagged output.An extreme
version of the expectational approach to investment behavior might lead
to the conclusion that investment is a random walk, parallel to Hall's
(1978) interpretation of consumption as a random walk.
All these models are merely alternative formulations of a single
underlying structure, the accelerator mechanism.However each model
results in a different specification for the appropriate reduced form
equation.This proliferation of structural models is also a problem
with the other mechanisms that are claimed to be of importance for
explaining investment, e.g., the Qapproach.To avoid losing sight of
our objectives by examining a multitude of different formulations, we
choose to set up "straw man"reducedforms that are relatively unres-
tricted and allow alternative explanatory variables suggested by alter-
native theories to enter on equal terms.
Contribution of the Accelerator and the Cost of Capital
We begin by examining reduced—form regressions for each of the four
individual categories of total investment:consumer durables, residen-
tial structures, producers durable equipment, and nonresidential struc-
tures.We begin at a disaggregated level and subsequently study the
consequences of alternative aggregation schemes.In Table 4 and later
tables, the full sample period of available quarterly data is divided44
into 1919—41 and 1947—83.In preliminary work a break was allowed in
the middle of the postwar period at 1965, but Chow tests rejectedthe
hypothesis of a structural change for most equations, andso here the
postwar period is treated as a single entity.There are insufficient
degrees of freedom available to test for a structural break within the
interwar periodat 1929.Chow tests indicate a decisive break in
structure at World Warii.16
Our reduced form equations omit the lagged capital stock (K...i)
term, which appears in (3), for two reasons.First, an identity links
the lagged capital stock and lagged investment, precludingan investment
equation containing several lagged values of investment from also
including several lagged values of the capital stock.Second, while a
single lagged value of the capital stock may appear, preliminary tests
indicated statistical insignificance in every sample period.
Tables 4 and 5 are arranged in two sections, corresponding to the
two sample periods (interwar and postwar).Each cell in the table
contains results for each of the four categories of investment spending
in the following format:the first line of each cell gives the sum of
coefficients with its significance level, and the second line exhibits
the significance level for an F—test on the exclusion of all lags of
that explanatory variable.A blank on the second line indicates that
the 10 percent level of statistical significance was not attained.
The first line for each investment type in Tables 4 and 5 presents
theregressionresults for what might be termed anaive accelerator!—
cost of capital" specification of the investment equation.The log
level of investment spending (I/XN) is regressed on 8 lagged first
differences of real non—investment GNP, N/XN, and 8 lagged valuesofTABLE 5
Equations for Household Investment,






































































































first differences of the appropriate real cost of capital series
(LC1P).Inthe regressions involving household investment in Table 5,
real personal disposable income,y1jxN,replaces real GNP, and 8 lags
of the first difference of the real Baa interest rate is used as a proxy
for the price of investment. In line 1both the and DW statistic are
very low for all categories over all periods, indicating a poor fit and
serially correlated errors.The "accelerator" variable passes the
exclusion test only for producers durables in the interwar and for
— LuLLuLCiiLILe pULWL.kUL eveujiUUAeLbLIowiLLg s
exhibited by the "cost of capital," which passes the exclusion test only
for postwar residential structures.
Line 2 in each block is identical to line 1, except that four lags
of the dependent variable are included as additional regressors.The
results from these regressions further weaken the case for the accelera-
tor and the price of investment.For all categories and all sample
periods the lagged dependent variables terms enter significantly at the
one percent level.Both the accelerator and the price of investment
become insignificant for most types and sample periods.While the
accelerator variable has explanatory power for postwar producers
durables, and consumer durables in both periods, the sums of the coeffi-
cients are insignificantly different from zero in every equation.
Overall this formulation of the two traditionally dominant explanations
of investment behavior fares poorly in both the interwar and the postwar
periods.
Contribution of QandReal Ml
As the sum of coefficients on lagged investment in line 2 of each46
block is close to unity, the equation amounts to an explanation of the
behavior of the first difference of investment.To be consistent with
the first difference format, in line 3 the accelerator is expressed as
the first difference of the first difference of real non—investment GNP,
MN/XN,and the remaining explanatory variables are entered as lagged
values of their first differences.Non—investment GNP and the cost of
capital or interest rate terms enter with 8 lags, while the remaining
explanatory variables enter with 4 lags.Our measure for Tobin's
average Qhasno significant explanatory power, except for postwar
nonresidential structures, and as often as not enters with the wrong
sign.The change in C/Pcontinuesto be insignificant in the exclusion
tests, although the sum of coefficients is significantly negative for
the two durables categories in the postwar.
Previous research by King (1983) and Sims (1983) has emphasized a
distinction between the role of inside and outside money as a determin-
ant of real output.In the work of King this distinction is implemented
by entering the two multiplicative components of Ml, the money
multiplier and monetary base (Mi/Pm(B/P)), separately in VAR models
for total output.We can investigate the same issue here and inquire
whether the effect of monetary changes on investment occurs through the
multiplier, the base, or a mixture of the two.The first difference
specification for the explanatory variables suggests that we should
split the change in Mi.into the level of the multiplier times the first
difference in the base (mtB/P), and the level of the base times the
first difference in the multiplier (l3/Ptm).Both components enter
significantly into the equations for producers and consumers durables,
interwar and postwar.The change in the money multiplier has moderate47
explanatory power for both structures categories in the postwar,as well
as for nonresidential structures in the interwar.
Other Specifications.
The final reduced form specification appears in line 3 or 4 of each
block.The specification in line 4 differs from that of line 3 only in
the exclusion of variables that are significant but have the wrong
sign.Both the accelerator and the price of investment are included
along with average Qandthe monetary variables.The accelerator
variable is significant only for postwar producer durables.We experi-
mented with alternative specifications of the final reduced form in
order to check the robustness of our results.In these tests the cost
of capital term in the business investment equations was replaced by the
real Baa rate, but this rate was never significant andas often as not
carried the wrong sign.
A variant of the "expectatiorial accelerator" was also estimated by
a two—stage procedure.Time series models for non—investment GNP and
personal disposable income were estimated and used to generate k—step
ahead forecasts.Eight leads of these forecasts, in various trans-
formations, were used as explanatory variables but were always insig-
nificant, often with the wrong sign, for all but postwar producers
durable equipment.This set of results implies that the significant
monetary variables in Tables 4 and 5 enter directly into the determin-
ation of investment spending, rather than indirectly through an effect
on expectations of future output.
Summary of Disaggregated Results
Perhaps the most surprising result of these initial reduced form48
estimates is the small explanatory role accorded conventional variables
and the large role given to unconventional variables like the real money
supply.The poor showing of the interest rate and cost of capital,
combined with the singular importance of average Qfornon—residential
structures, lead one to suspect that the financing decision is an
important determinant of investment expenditures.The broad role played
by the money multiplier may indicate that credit rationing, rather than
interest rate changes, may be the primary constraint in the financing
decision.This view is consistent with that expressed in Roosa (1950)
as to the dominant channel through which monetary policy affects the
economy.
The similarities in the behavior of the two structures and the two
durable goods categories suggest that aggregation by asset type rather
than by decision maker is preferable.This approach to disaggregation
would also be in accord with Tobin's asset approach, insofar as durable
goods are normally shorter lived than structures.However, this
approach is at odds with the conventional structural approach to
investment.With its focus on the investment decision, the traditional
approach has always aggregated by the decision—maker (i.e., household
vs. business) rather than by the character of the asset (i.e.,
structures vs. equipment).
Aggregation Schemes
Table 6 displays our basic equation for two alternative aggregation
schemes, household/business and durables/structures. The household
/business aggregation scheme is not particularly successful.In the
interwar period both categories appear to be autonomous, with onlyTABLE 6
Equations for Alternative Aggregation Schemes
Interwar and Postwar Sample Periods
Explanatory LaggedVariables
B/Pm R2 S.E.E. IN MYDr SC/PLQ mB/P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1921 :Q3—1941 :Q3
Household
.96*** —.18 .07 —.01 .27* •75** .98 .442
***
Business
•95***.26 .23 .01 .41 l.ll** .97 .647
*** *
Durables
.91** —.22 .32** .01 .48*** l.07***.97 .430
** *** ***
Structures
•94***.43 .14 —.01 .27 l.36** •97 •754
1949:Q1—1983:Q4
Household
.31_77*** —.02 l.16**k1.96*** .89 .399
* ***
Business
i.0i .46** _.24** .03** •45 •74*** .94 .222
***
Durables
.98***.81** _97*** .02 l.67***2.23***.96 .401
*** *** ** ***
Structures
•97*** —.16 —.24 .01 .16 .60***.97 .198
***
0TE: See bottom of Table 4.49
lagged "own values" passing the exclusion test (as well as the money
multiplier in the business equation).Both real monetary variables
become highly significant for the two categories in the postwar.The
only difference in behavior between household and business investment
appears In the postwar, when business investment exhibits a strong
accelerator effect.If we were to ignore real balance effects, as does
most of the literature, then aggregation by decision—maker would result
in a pair of highly autonomous investment series in the interwar period.
Stated another way, this aggregation scheme would indicate that the
decision—maker does not respond to relevant economic variables.
Aggregation by the asset character of investment leads to more
illuminating results.Durable equipment and structures exhibit marked
differences in behavior in both sample periods.Structures investment
for 1919—41 is quite autonomous, but durables expenditures exhibit
sensitivity to interest rates (with the wrong sign) and to real monetary
variables.More important is the finding that real money balances are
highly significant in explaining both investment categories in the
postwar.Durable goods are sensitive to the accelerator and interest
rates (with the correct sign), whereas structures depend significantly
on the average Qvariable.This result may indicate the importance of
the different financing methods that are used for equipment and Struc-
tures.One might think of short—lived assets as financed to a large
extent by internally generated funds, i.e., retained earnings and
disposable income, while investment in structures may depend heavily on
conditions in the bond and security markets.
Using the alternative aggregation criterion of asset durability
produces the most sensible results in Table 6.Investment behavior is50
found to differ between short and long—lived assets in a way that is
statistically significant.The accelerator and the Baa rate are both
important for investment in durables, while structures (dominated by the
non—residential category) respond to average Q.Theseresults provide
evidence supporting the importance of financial conditions for invest-
ment decisions.What is surprising is the way in which the conventional
investment literature, with its emphasis on the business investment
decision, has overemphasized disaggregation by decision—maker and has
glossed over the importance of the asset characteristics of investment
and the role of real monetary variables.
V.INVESTMENT IN A VECTOR—AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL
Correlations Among Contemporaneous Innovations
The equations estimated in Tables 4—6 investigate the feedback from
the various lagged explanatory variables to components of investment,
but they say nothing about the relationships among contemporaneous
innovations in the variables, nor about the feedback from investment to
the explanatory variables.These issues can be addressed by analyzing a
vector—autoregressive (VAR) system that contains the primary variables
of interest.We economize on space by restricting attention to a VAR
model containing six variables——real investment in structures (ISTR),
real investment in durable goods (lUG), real non—investment GNP (N), the
real money base (B/P), the Ml money multiplier (m), and the real Baa
interest rate (r).For the interwar period the interest rate variable
in Table 6 has the incorrect (positive) sign in the equations for both
ISTR and IDG, leading us to choose a five—variable system omitting the
interest rate for 1920—41.51
All variables (except m and r) are once again expressed as ratios
to natural real GNP(xN).Tomaintain the symmetry required for the VAR
system, all variables are expressed as first differences, in contrast to
Tables 4—6, where investment is expressed as a ratio, output as a second
difference, and the other variables as first differences.Extra degrees
of freedom allow the inclusion of eight lags on all variables in the
postwar period, as opposed to four lags in the interwar period.
Columns in Table 7 correspond to each of the six variables in the
VAR system.A slash (I) divides the interwar result from the postwar
result in both the top and bottom sections of the table.The dashes
(———)indicatethe exclusion of the interest rate in the interwar
model.The top section shows correlations among contemporaneous
innovations.There is a uniformly high correlation between the two
components of investment, ISTR and II)G.Another similarity between the
interwar and postwar is the positive correlation between the money
multiplier (m) and both ISTR and IDG, the negative correlation between
IDG and the monetary base (B/P), and the high negative correlation
between the base and the multiplier.Perhaps the most important
difference between the interwar and postwar periods is the sharp decline
in the correlation of durable goods investment (IDG) with non—investment
CNP (N).This is similar to the decomposition of variance in Table 3
above and may indicate that N in the interwar is dominated by a common
impulse to private spending that also influenced lUG, whereas in the
postwar N was more affected by defense expenditures in the Korea and
Vietnam periods which had no impact or even a negative impact on IDG.
The correlations of the base and the multiplier with non—investment
GNP change signs in the postwar period.This is suggestive of a change51A
TABLE 7
Correlation Coefficients and Exogeneity Tests
in Basic VAR Models
(Interwar/Postwar)
AISTR AIDG AN AB/P Am Ar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Correlations
AIDG .35/ .35
AN —.04/ .09 .51/ .04
AB/P .09/ .18 —.17/—.17 —.29/ .17
Am .19/ .25 .24/ .28 .30/—.07 —.54/—.39
———I—.26 ———I—.15 ——-/-.00 ——-I-. 30 ---I-.21
ExogeneityTests
AISTR AIDG AB/P
AISTR / / */
/ /**
AIDG /** **/*** ___/*
/ / /*
/ ___/***
AB/P / / / ***/*** ***/**
/ / /**
---/ ---/ ---I ---/ _/*
NOTE:Asterisks designate significance levels at the 10 percent (*),5 percent(**),
and1 percent (***) levels. Blanks indicate that the interest rate is ex—
cluded from the model for the interwar period.52
in the behavior of monetary policy between the two periods.Another
"structural" shift is suggested by the change of the coefficient of the
interest rate on IDG from positive (shown in Table 6 but not Table 7) to
negative.This should be interpreted in conjunction with the sharp
decline in the correlation of N and IDG in the postwar period.These
facts may indicate that durable goods expenditures in the interwar
tended to be more constrained by income or retained earnings, while in
the postwar period the availability and price of credit was relatively
more important.
Multi—variate Exogeneity Tests
The bottom section of Table 7 displays significance levels for the
contribution of each explanatory variable in each equation.Explanatory
variables are represented by the six columns, and dependent variables by
the six lines.Asterisks denote the same significance levels as in
Tables 4—6, and are calculated from F—ratios on the joint exclusion of
all lags of a particular variable.Often such tables reveal a highly
significant set of diagonal elements, reflecting highly significant
lagged dependent variables in the VAR equations.This occurs here only
for lOG, BIP,andm.The insignificance of the other diagonal elements
may reflect the fact that all variables in the model are expressed as
first differences.
Investment in structures appears to be relatively exogenous in both
periods, with modest feedback from non—investment GNP in the interwar
and the money multiplier in the postwar.Durable goods investment
exhibits substantial feedback from several variables in either or both
periods, and in this sense in much less "autonomous" than investment in53
structures.The pattern of monetary influences on IDG and N differs.
While IDG reflects significant feedback from the base and the multiplier
in both periods, N reflects feedback from the base in both periods, the
interest rate in the postwar, and the multiplier in neither period.A
notable feature of the pattern of exogeneity is the independence of the
money multiplier and the interest rate from almost all the other
variables.In the postwar the interest rate is totally independent of
all the remaining variables, feeding into only IDG and N. The channel of
influence from the interest rate to investment,if any, appears to be
indirect, running through non—investment GNP, with only a weak direct
effect in the postwar.The pattern of these exogeneity results may
suggest the existence of two impulse sources in the business cycle, one
financial (interest rates and money multiplier) and the other real
(investment in structures), whose effects interact through the
propagation mechanism represented here by the remaining variables.
Innovation Accounting
VAR modeling techniques are often criticized for the ambiguity
inherent in the a priori ordering of the variables necessary to carry
out the usual "innovation accounting" exercise.However the allocation
of the variance of the investment categories between 'own" innovations
and innovations in other explanatory variables is of interest in any
investigation of the role played by investment in business cycles.As
with our choice of aggregation schemes, we allow our earlier empirical
results to suggest "appropriate" orderings of the variables.The equa-
tions estimated in Table 6 suggest that investment in structures is
quite autonomous, a result reinforced by the exogeneity tests of Table54
7.Our basic model, as it appears in the top half of Table 8,places
structures (ISTR) first in the ordering, followed by investment in
durables (IDG).Gestation lags in both types of investment make it
plausible that at least one quarter is required before investment
spending can be influenced by changes in non—investment real GNP (N),
the real base (B/P), the multiplier (m), or interest rate (r).Although
our empirical results cast doubt on other ordering schemes, a priori
notions about the importance of autonomous government spending in the
postwar might suggest an ordering with non—investment real GNP first,
followed by investment in structures, then durables.Results for this
ordering appear in the bottom half of Table 8.The interest rate is
placed last in both orderings, as the theory of efficient markets would
suggest an instantaneous response to innovations in other variables.
B/P and m are intermediate variables but are capable of moving quickly,
particularly if the Federal Reserve is operating to stabilize the
interest rate.
[n the ordering with structures first, the own innovation of
structures accounts for the majority of its variance at the 16 quarter
forecast horizon in both sample periods.This own contribution is not
altered in the slightest by placing N first in the ordering.Structures
appear to be virtually autonomous, with a highly significant influence
only from the money multiplier in the postwar.ISTR accounts for more
than 10 percent of the variance of IDG in both periods, N and r in the
postwar, and m in the interwar.In an alternative version of the model
in which the variables are expressed in levels (not shown in Table 8),
the role of ISTR is substantially greater, accounting for at least one
third of the variance of almost all the other variables in both54A
TABLE 8






Note:As in Table 7, blanks indicate that
the model for the interwar period.
the interest rate is excluded from
Dependent
AIDC AN AB/P Am Ar
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AN AISTR A I DC
AISTR 76.8/58.04.4/ 4.27.7/ 5.63.3/ 2.87.8/22.5 ———I 7.0
AIDG 13.2/15.8 44.4/45.4 10.0/ 8.1 8.3/ 5.2 24.1/11.7 ———/13.7
AN 7.8/10.0 20.9/ 3.3 47.6/56.6 10.5/ 6.7 13.2/10.4 ———/13.0
AB/P 6.7/ 4.8 4.9/ 7.3 11.7/ 7.1 63.0/68.6 13.7/ 8.3 ———1 3.9
Am 13.2/ 7.4 8.6/ 5.4 13.5/ 6.5 24.7/20.5 40.0/49.4 ———/10.8
Ar ——--/10.3 ———I 7.1 ———I 2.2 ———1 7.4 ———/11.0 ———/62.0
AB/P Ar
AN 64.8/57.57.7/ 9.13.8/ 3.310.5/ 6.713.2/10.4 ———/13.0
AISTR 5.3/ 6.676.9/57.16.7/ 4.13.3/ 2.87.8/22.5 —--—I 7.0
AIDG 19.6/ 8.813.7/15.034.3/45.58.3/ 5.224.1/11.7 ———/13.7
AB/P 13.5/ 7.87.0/ 4.12.8/ 7.463.0/68.613.7/ 8.3 ———I 3.9
Am 16.1/ 6.513.8/ 7.45.4/ 5.424.7/20.540.0/49.4 ———/10.8
Ar ——--I 2.1 ———/10.5 ———7 7.0 ———7 7.4 ———/11.0 ———/62.0
Am55
periods.
Innovations in IDGaccountfor more of the variance of N than vice
versa in the interwar period, which might be interpreted as indicating
that the multiplier was a stronger influence than the accelerator during
thatinterval. Investment in durables displays substantial feedback
from both investment in structures and from the money multiplier in both
periods.The fact that the money multiplier has a larger effect on the
three categories of spending (ISTR, IDG, and N) than the two other
financial variables (B/P and r) may indicate that the collapse of the
banking system in the 1929—33 period and disintermediation in the
postwar period were important channels of influence, proxied by the
money multiplier, of the financial system on real expenditures.As
mentioned above, the ordering in the bottom of Table 8 that places N
first does not change these results significantly, and this seems to
support our argument for the exogeneity of investment in structures.
Historical Decomposition of Variance in Both Investment Types
A more revealing display of the implications of the VARmodelis
contained in the historical decomposition of each series in the system
over each of the sample periods.The ordering used in arriving at these
decompositions was that of our basic VARmodelwhich places the explana-
tory variables in the order showninthe top half of Table 8 (ISTR, IDG,
N, B/F, m and r).To limit the number of diagrams, we present only the
decomposition of the two categories of investment —interwarstructures
in Figure 4 and durable goods in Figure 5,followed by postwar
structures in Figure 6 and durable goods in Figure 7.
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investment with a "projection" which summarizes the net effect of the
constant terms in all of the equations.The contribution of each of the
other variables in the system then appears below.These contributions
do not refer just to the lagged values times the estimated coefficients
in the IDG equation alone, but rather to the contributions of the
innovations in each variable to investment behavior, takingaccount of
all channels of feedback working through the six—equation model (recall
that interest rates are excluded in the interwar period).
The predominant role of own—innovations in the structures
investment (ISTR) process is evident in Figure 4.There is a high
plateau in the own—innovations series in 1926—27, a gradual downward
movement in1928—29, and a sharp downward plunge beginning in l929:Q3,
prior to the fourth—quarter stock market debacle.Equally interesting
is that the own—innovation series remains negative throughout the 1931—
41 period, supporting the interpretation of "overbuilding" in the 1920s
that required a long period of subsequent adjustment in the 1930s.
Two other variables display interesting patterns in Figure 4.The
real monetary base (B/F) makes a major negative contrIbution in 1927—31
and a positive contribution in 1938-41.The latter episode is easy to
understand in light of the large inflow of gold to the U.S. during this
period.However, the decline in the contribution in B/P in 1927—31may
seem puzzling, since nominal B varied little in the Great Contraction of
1929—33, while the price level (P) declined substantially.The behavior
of the B/P contribution can be explained in terms of the "projection"
for B/P (not shown), which displays a sharp upward trend during the
entire 1920—41 period in response to the doubling of B/P between 1920
and 1941.The actual value of B/P is below this "projection"57
continuously from 1920 to 1938 and then above it from 1939 to 1941.
Thus the VARhistoricaldecomposition algorithm interprets the slow
increase in the real base in 1927—31 as being an actual decline relative
to trend, and this is reflected in the contribution of base innovations
to structures investment in Figure 4.The other variable making an
important contribution is the money multiplier, which exhibits a sharp
decline during the period of monetary contraction and bank failures
between 1931 and 1933, as well as after the increase in reserve
requirements in 1936—37.The role of the multiplier makes our analysis
compatible with the emphasis on the financial crisis in Bernanke (1983b).
Figure 5 shows the interwar historical decomposition of innovations
to equipment investment.Compared to Figure 4 for interwar structures,
the own—innovations in IDC are relatively less important and the
innovations in the monetary base and money multiplier are, more
important.To some extent the innoVations in the base and multiplier
are offsetting, and this reflects in part the upward trend of the base
and downward trend of the multiplier in the interwar period.However,
we recall from Tables 4—6 that both the base and the multiplier have
consistently positive coefficients in the interwar regression equations
for expenditures on durables.
Figures 6 and 7 decompose the variance of ISTR and IDC for the
postwar years.Note that in these figures the scale is compressed
horizontally and expanded vertically, since the ratio of investment to
natural output varied over so much smaller a range in the postwar
period.Figure 6 for postwar structures shares with the interwar Figure
4 a predominant role for oininnovations.However, Figure 7 for
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FIG. 7— DECOMPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT
PROJECTION
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Structures innovations play a much more important role in explaining
postwar durables expenditure fluctuations than the own—innovations in
durables.Further, there is a substantial role for real interestrate
innovations in Figure 7, supporting the highly significant negative
coefficients on the real interest rate variable in Tables 4—6.The
effect of high real interest rates in 1981—83 in reducing investment
expenditures is particularly noticeable.
Thus any conclusion in this paper that investment containsa large
autonomous component must refer mainly to structures, whereas durable
equipment investment displays substantial feedback from bothstructures
investment and from financial variables.It does not seem surprising
that there should he feedback from structures investmentto equipment
investment, since the two activities are complementary.Construction of
a new factory, office building, or shopping center requires investment
in equipment, lust as residential construction stimulates investmentin
furniture, appliances, and other components ofconsumer durable
expenditures.
The Temin "Autonomous Shift'in 1930
An important part of Temin's (1976) interpretation of the first
stage of the Great Contraction of 1929—33 is an autonomous shift in
consumption in 1930, which he identified by estimating an annual
consumption function.Our purpose here is not to review the controversy
stirred up by Tenth's result (see Mayer, 1980), but rather to reexamine
his hypothesis using the more definitive microscope provided byour
quarterly data set.Table 9 exhibits quarter—by—quarter residuals from
ourinterwarVAR models for the sixteen quarters covering 1929—32.59
Asterisks are used to mark off residuals greater in size than 1.0
standard error of estimate (see notes to Table 9).
The five variables of the model are the first differences of,
respectively, investment in structures (ISTR), investment in durables
(IDG), non—investment real GNP (N), the real monetary base (B/F), and
the money multiplier.All variables (except m) are expressed as per—
,centage ratios to natural real CNP, and beneath the residuals the table
shows the level of these ratios in 1929:Q2, ranging from 5.6 percent for
the monetary base to 77.6 percent for non—investment real GNP.Here we
treat the behavior of non—investment real GNF as representingconsump-
tion," actually nondurable consumption, since in 1929 nondurable
consumption made up 85.2 percent of N, and accounted for 74.6 percent of
the decline in N from 1929 to 1930.
The emphasis in this paper on autonomous movements in investment,
particularly structures investment, is supported in Table 9.There were
three large negative innovations in 1929—30 to ISTR, including one in
1929:Q3, one quarter prior to the business downturn and stock market
crash.There was a large negative innovation in lOG in 1929:04.The
cumulative residuals of ISTR and IDG in 1929—30 amount, respectively, to
—25.2 and —17.2 percent of their levels in 1929:Q2.In contrast, the
only large N residual for 1929—30 is positive in 1929:Q3.The
cumulative N residuals in 1929—30 amount to only —1.6 percent of its
level in 1929:Q2.Thus we find no evidence that negative residuals for
nondurable consumption played a key role in the initial stages of the
Great Contraction.
Two other interesting results are evident in Table 9.First, there
are substantial negative innovations in the real monetary base beginningTABLE 9
Residuals ("Innovations") in Interwar VAR Model,
1929 :Q1—1932 :Q4
ISTR IDG N SB/P tin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1929:1 0.77* 0.05 1.10 —0.38* 0.12*
2 0.10 —0.29 —0.89 —0.10 —0.04
3 0.41 3.10** —0.08 0.02
4 —1.11 —1.07 —0.21 —0.03
1930:1 —0.14 —0.13 —1.45 —0.08 0.04
2 —0.03 —0.48 —1.35 —0.11 —0.02
3 —0.36 —0.11 —0.22 —0.05
4 —0.12 —0.19 —0.55 —0.01 0.01
1931:1 —0.21 —0.46 0.81 0.34* —0.07
2 —0.21 0.04 1.27 —0.14 —0.09*
3 —0.54 —0.45 —2.01* 0.40
4 0.10 0.09 —0.65 0.04 —0.09*
1932:1 —0.69 0.32 0.10 0.21 —0.04
2 0.08 0.10 —0.35 0.07 —0.01
3 0.63 0.15 —1.42 —0.35* 0.06
4 0.34 0.02 0.67 0.29 0.03
Level in
1929:Q2 12.2 12.2 77.6 5.6 4.4
ComulativeResiduals
—2.10 —1.22 —1.19 0.17 1929—30 —3.08
1931—32 —0.46 —0.23 —1.58 0.86 —0.42
CumulativeResiduals as
—17.2 —1.6 —20.5 3.9
Percent of1929:Q2 Level
1929—30 —25.2
1931—32 —3.8 —1.9 —2.0 14.8 —9.5
Note: Asterisks are used to denote residuals as follows:(*)indicates
between 1.0 and 1.5 times the sample—period standarderror, and (**)
indicates greater than 1.5 standard errors.60
as early as 1929:Q1 and cumulating to —20.5 percent of the l929:Q2 level
in1929—30.Second, the largest cumulative negative residuals in the
1931—32 period are contributed by the money multiplier, supporting a
role for bank failures and the credit contraction in aggravating the
contraction.Especially interesting is the large negative multiplier
innovation in 1931:Q3, the quarter that the Fed tightened its policy
following Britain's departure from the Gold Standard.
Overall, these results are consistent with our interpretation of
two sources of the business cycle, real and financial, with the negative
innovations in real investment playing a dominant role in 1929—30, and
with the nature of the negative financial innovations shifting from a
contribution of the monetary base in 1929—30 to one by the money
multiplier in 1931—32.
VI.SUMMARYANT) CONCLUSION
Methodology and Data Description
Most of the tests ofstructural" investment equations that have
been carried out in the literature embody what Sims (1980) calls
"incredibleexclusion restrictions.The literature on the neoclassical
investment paradigm embodies prior assumptions about the form of the
production function.In its putty—putty version it neglects expecta-
tions entirely, and in its putty—clay version it fails to allow time—
series aggregate variables to play multiple roles in the formation of
expectations in different phases of the investment process.As a
result, coefficients on variables like lagged output and interest rates
cannot be interpreted in the structural way that has been typical in the
literature.61
The Tobin "Q"theorystarts from a plausible point of departure but
then takes itself too seriously, allowing only Qtoinfluence invest-
ment.There seems to he no reason why the single Qvariable,whether or
not it is measured witherror,should embody all influences of other
variables on the investment process.Our discussion emphasizes in par-
ticular the role of asymmetric adjustment costs, as well as the tradeoff
firms face between costly alternatives when the stock market givesone
set of signals and output or other variables give a conflicting set of
signals.
We conclude that the difficulties of structural equation—building
are irremediable.As a substitute we carry out a hybrid methodology, in
which theory is used to suggest sets of variables and their form, but
empirical estimation is carried out by estimating equations in the
symmetric VAR format, with all explanatory variables entering the
investmentequation, and with the dependent variable included with the
same number of lags.Our hybrid approach thus combines insights from
structural models with the unconstrained approach to testing and data
exploration tha typifies investigations using VAR models.
Our first empirical task is to establish the importance of fixed
investment in historical business cycles.Using procedures described in
the Data Appendix, we have created a new set of quarterly dataon major
expenditure components of GNP extending hack to l919:Q1.We include
four types of real investment expenditures in our study——producer's
durable equipment, nonresidential structures, residential structures,
and consumer durable expenditures.The decLtne in the sum of these four
components ('I") contributes between one—third and one—half of the
decline in real GNFinrecessions, even though the share of Iin GNPat62
the typical business cycle peak is about one—quarter.Total investment
actually was relatively more important in postwar recessions between
1957 and 1980 than it was during the Great Contraction of 1929—33.
A decomposition of variance allows a description of the relation
between investment (I) and non—investment real GNP (N) in major epi-
sodes.The interwar years were characterized by a high own—variance of
investment, narticularly in 1919—29, and after 1929 by a high covariance
between I and N.The own—variance of N was more important in the
postwar period and was dominated by the Korean war episode.Of the four
components of investment, the own variance of nonresidential structures
was the largest in the interwar period, while the own varianceof
consumer durable expenditures was largest in the postwar period.
Implications for Four Schools of Thought
Keynesians, monetarists, neoclassicists, and Qadvocatesall have
an interest in the results of this investigation.Nenhers of each group
will he disappointed with our results,if they are seeking support of
"monocausal" or "one—factor' hypotheses of investment behavior.Yet
ironically the empirical findings offer some solace to each group,
because they provide substantial support for an eclectic view of invest-
ment that blends elements of each approach, while providing evidence
against opponents of each approach who insist on some alternative
monocausal explanation.
Keynesians view investment behavior as containing a substantial
autonomous component.Our empirical investment equations summarized in
Table 6, together with thehistorical decompositions in Figures 4—7,
supportthe view that autonomous innovations in structures investment63
are an important driving force in the business cycle.In Table 8 the
effect of innovations in structures investment on durable equipment
expenditures, as well as on non—investment GNP, is greater than the
reverse feedback from equipment and non—investment GNP innovations to
structures investment, in both the interwar and postwar periods.The
boom in structures investment between 1923—29, the subsequent slump in
the 1930s,as well as the smaller negative innovations in the early
1960s and boom in 1971—73, all can he viewed mainly as autonomous events
rather than as a passive reaction to other economic variables.
While monetarists would doubtless be unhappy with a view that
treats major swings in structures investment as autonomous, they
nevertheless have the consolation of learning that the response of both
structures and equipment investment to the real money supply is
significantly greater than to the 'traditional" variables in investment
equations, the accelerator (output change), the user cost of capital,
and "Q".Theeffect of money, split here between the real monetary base
and the Ml money multiplier, is suhstantial in both the interwar and
postwar periods.The regression results in Table 6 find a strong impact
of both the base and multiplier on equipment investment in the interwar
period, and on both structures and equipment investment in the postwar.
The historical, decompositions in Figures 4—7 indicate that base innova-
tions had an important impact on both structures and equipment invest—
ment, as well as on non—investment CNP, in the interwar period, whereas
the multiplier played a role in both the interwar and postwar periods.
It seems ironic that this study of investment behavior provides
more support for the general views of the economy represented by
Keynesians and monetarists than it does for the views of specialists in64
the investment process, the neoclassicists and Qadvocates.In Tables 4
and 5the user cost of capital for businesses, and the real interest
rate For households, are insignificant or have the wrong sign in every
equation for the interwar years.The equations for consumer and
producers durable spending exhibit a significant and correctly signed
(negative) sum of coefficients for the postwar period, but in every
postwar equation the user cost or interest rate variable fails an
"exclusion test" on the joint significance of all lagged values in the
explanation of investment spending.The verdict on the Q approach is
even more negative.In the aggregated regression equations of Table 6,
the Qvariablepasses the exclusion test only in one equation, for
postwar structures investment.This appears in Table 4to be
attributable to the nonresidential component of structures investment.
Such results pose a new task for Qtheorists,that is, to determine what
factors would make investment in structures more responsive to 0 than
investment in producers' equipment.
Our empirical work casts doubt on the importance of the accelerator
hypothesis of investment behavior that has been supported by some past
work, e.g., Clark (1979).The simple device of including four lags on
the dependent variable in equations explaining total I eliminates the
significant explanatory contribution of lagged values of real GNP,
except in the equipment equations for the postwar period.However we
find that it is possible to obtain significant sums of coefficients for
an accelerator effect in a postwar durable equipment equation only when
real GNP is entered as a second rather than first difference.These
findings support our basic interpretation that there is a sharp
difference between the behavior of structures and equipment investment,65
with the former behaving mainly in an autonomous fashion, whereas the
latter reflects feedback both from investment in structures and from
financial and monetary variables.
Deeper Issues and Unsettled Questions for Future Research
In a recent paper Blanchard (1981,p. 154)) reached the conclusion
that ...themultiplier is dead and the accelerator alive.'This
paper reaches the opposite conclusion, particularly for the structures
component of investment.The accelerator muchanism, interpreted as the
feedback from autonomous movements in non—investment GNP to investment
in structures, seems to be considerably weaker than the multiplier
mechanism, interpreted in the elementary textbook fashion as the effect
on total GNP of autonomous movements of investment, particularly the
structures component.While there is a substantial effect of monetary
and financial variables on investment, nevertheless there are major and
persistent movements in investment that occur in both the interwar and
postwar periods that cannot he explained by prior changes in output,
money, stock prices, or interest rates.
The fact that we label major movements in structures investment as
'autonomous" does not mean that we leave them unexplained.Rather, this
basic interpretation of the paper treats structures investment as
exogenous with respect to the explanatory variables included in our
statistical analysis.This does not rule out other explanations, and in
fact we can offer three complementary explanations of the behavior of
structures investment in the interwar period.First, the residential
structures boom of the 1920s and subsequent slump of the1930scan be
explained in part by demographic factors that lie outside the scope of66
thispaper.While the rapid population growth of 1900—1920, together
with the postponement of construction during World War I and the 1920—21
recession, may provide a partial explanation of the intensity of the
1920sresidential construction boom, the restrictive immigration law of
1924 and subsequent deceleration in population growth may help to
account for the decline in residential construction after 1926.
Hickman (1973) has documented both the effect of the decline in
population growth on the desired housing stock and also the extent of
overbuilding in the mid—1920s.Hickman's work treats the rate of
population growth as endogenous, with the rate of household formation
responding to the growth rate of income, and he is able to decompose the
observed decline in the rate of population growth between the early
1920s and mid—1930s into two components, that due to the effect of
declining income, and a remaining exogenous decline due primarily to the
decline in immigration.In order to isolate the effect of the exogenous
component of the decline in household formation, Hickman calculated two
dynamic simulations of his model, one in which standardized households
are assumed to increase steadily at the 1924—25 rate of growth, and
another in which income and other economic variables are identical hut
in which standardized households follow their actual declining path
after 1925.The impact of the actual demographic slump gradually
becomes more important as the 1930s progress, accounting for a decline
in housing starts between the two simulations of 28.3 percent for 1933
and 39.1 percent for 1940.His result is consistent with our Figure 4
above, in whichthe own—innovationin structures investment is negative
throughout the 1930s.
A second factor, more relevant for investment in structures than in67
equipment, is the element of speculation.The Florida land boom of the
1920s, the stock market "bubble" of 1928—29, and earlier investment
excesses like the "South Seas bubble" of the early eighteen century, all
have some similarity to the construction boom of the 1920s.For six
years (1923—28) real residential construction achieved a level more than
double the average of the entire decade before World War I, and in four
successive years (1924—27) the ratio of real residential construction
investment to GNPreachedby far its highest level of the twentieth
century.Hickman estimates that even with a continuation of population
growth at the 1924—25 rate, rather than a post—1925 decline, housing
starts would have fallen by 35 percent between 1925 and 1930 (as a ratio
to natural real GNP,it actually fell by percent).
Nor is the phenomenon of overbuilding confined to the interwar
period.Figure 6 shows that the postwar own innovation to structures
investment peaked in 1972—73.Several years later contemporary accounts
recognized the phenomenon of overbuilding:
'In Chicago, new apartment construction has just about
ceased.In Atlanta, where there is at least a three—year
supply of unsold condominiums overhanging the market, mortgage
companies are auctioning off high—rise units to the public at
two—thirds their original asking price ....Thecurrent
problems stem from overbuilding in the early 1970s'"The Great
High—rise Bust," Newsweek (August 30, 1976),p.5.
The third factor that may be an important explanation behind the
apparently "autonomous" structures investment boom of the 1920s and
slump of the 1930s is the "Schumpeterian" bunching of innovations.This
hypothesis is developed by R. A. Gordon (1951), whoargues that the68
buoyancy of both residential and nonresidential construction in the
1920s reflected in large part the influence of the automobile in
expanding the boundaries of urban areas:
"Between 1923 and 1929 the growing use of automobiles and
trucks had a more important impact on total investment and
employment than did the expansion of motor vehicle output.
Motor vehicle registrations in 1929 were about 75 percent
greater than in 1923 and nearly three times the number in
1920. ...largescale investment was necessary for roads and
bridges, oil wells, pipe lines, garages and service stations,
and tire and automobile supply stores, as well as for oil
refining and tire manufacture.In addition, the automobile
accelerated the trends toward urbanization and 'suburhaniza—
tion', stimulating thereby residential and commercial
building."
Otherindustries were also involved in the bunching of investment
opportunities in the 1920s.Among these wereelectric power——well over
halfof the installation of electric generating capacity during 1902—40
occurredduring the decade of the 1920s.Other important new industries
were radio, telephone, and chemicals.
The results in this paper support the view that there are two basic
impulses in the business cycle, real and financial.The real impulse
appears in our statistical evidence as an autonomous innovation to
investment in structures.This concluding section has suggested three
factors that mayunderlie thecycle in structures investment.We choose
to emphasize this element of investment behavior here because it has
received relatively little attention in recent research, however69
familiar it may seem to experts on the earlier literature on business
cycles.The financial impulse works through the effect on investment of
changes in the monetary base and money multiplier, as well as the real
interest rate for postwar investment in durable equipment.In these
results the money multiplier may be acting as a proxy for such phenomena
as the banking contraction of 1929—33 and the episodes ofcredit
crunches and disintermediation in the postwar years.
Many avenues for future research are opened up by these results.
Past studies of structures investment need to be reviewed for problens
of identification and simultaneity that may have led to a misleading
emphasis on the investment accelerator, rather than autonomous
movements, as the driving force behind structures investment.Our
inability to find a strong influence of the stock market (working
through our Qvariable)on investment, except for postwar nonresidential
structures, needs to he reconciled with the recent findings of Fischer
and Nerton (1984), who find a stronger connection between economic
activity and prior movements in the stock market.Finally we hope that
our new quarterly interwar data on components ofexpenditures will
stimulate further research into the interrelations of real and financial
variables during the Great Depression.FOOTNOTES
1.Recall the famous debate of the mid—1960s set off by the attempt by
Milton Friedman and David Mejselrnan (1963) to characterize "autonomous
spending" and "the money supply" as the driving forces in the Keynesian
and in their own models of income determination, respectively.
2.The quantitative importance of the credit crunch phenomenon is
explored in the paper 1w Eckstein and Sinai in this volume.
3.This paragraph reflects an oral history provided to us by Fumio
Hayashi.
4.Even if a project is financed by issuing a long—term bond onthe day
of its completion, time periods after the date of completion are
relevant both for the taxation of earnings and for any capital gains
that may accrue.
5.Students of U.S.twentieth century architecture know that there was
virtually no central—city office building construction between 1930 and
1955; that is, there was neither any expansion in the number of square
feet nor any replacement of old buildings, both for the same set of
reasons.
6.To be consistent with the rest of the formulation, the term
in (6) should he an expectation, not an actual value.This
approximation is adopted to simplify the reduced form in (8) below.
7.As an example, airlines that ordered the Boeing 757 and 767aircraft
in 1978 reacted to the previously unexpected period of poorprofits that
occurred during 1980—82 both by cancelling part or all of their orders,
and by "stretching out" the delivery period.American Airlines
initially ordered both the 757 and 767, and cancelled its entire orderF- 2
for 757 aircraft.United Airlines has stretched the delivery dateson
half of its 767 order by up to five years, and has threatened to cancel
that half.
8."For the information set containing also aggregate sales, thestruc-
tural model performed poorly, being unable to explain the relation——or
the lack of relation ——betweeninvestment in a sector and aggregate
sales ....Themodel ...isclearly not structural; some of its
maintained assumptions ...arerejected by the data.Some of the
additional assumptions made in estimation...arerejected for some of
the sectors.Nor are the econometric results overwhelmingly supportive"
(Abel—Blanchard, p. 44).
9.Hall (1977, p.88)shows that with a geometric delivery lag, only
the current value of Qenters.Tn the basic analysis of Abel and
Hayashi, only current Qentersand gestation lags are a special case.
10.The poor post—sample performance of the Qapproachis illustrated
by Clark (1979) on p.93.Since his article was written, a national
accounts revision has substantially raised the level of actual invest-
ment for the later 1970s, thus implying an even poorer performance of
the Qapproach.
11.SeeCompanies Feel Underrated by Street," Business Week, February
20,1984, p.14.
12.There are exceptions, however, particularly for residential
housing.See deLeeuw (1971), Feldstein (1981), and Polinsky (1977).
13.Unrealistically restrictive assumptions regarding the set of
variables admissahie into the information set pervade theoretical
papers, not lust empirical tests.In a related paper John Taylor (1983)
derives a model of investment with gestation lags that shares with (4)F—3
and (6) the feature that current investment orders depend on
expectations of both future output and capital costs.Taylor is not
concerned with the identification issues under discussion here, but he
does choose to simplify his model as do Abel—Blanchard, by making
expectations of future output depend only on past output, and in
addition makes future capital cost depend only on future and past
output.By omitting the multiple roles for past financial variables in
determining expectations of all future variables.Taylor thus
introduces prior simplifying restrictions that have no empirical
justification.
14. Artassessmentof the 1981—83disinflation experiment' using the
DRI model and a reduced—form approach is presented in papers by Eckstein
(1983) and Gordon (1983a, 1984b).A detailed quantitative review of the
performance of my equation in post—sample dynamic simulations is
provided by Perry (1983).
15.See Gordon (1977) and Sims' comments in the printed discussion of
that paper.
16.Recall that quantitative controls during World War Ii preclude a
meaningful analysis of investment behavior during that period.Further,
some of the series used for our data interpolation are not available
after 1941, thus our data series have not been created for the 1942—46
interval.DATA APPENDIX
1.General Description:
This paper investigates the behavior of investment in the U.S.
economy over both the interwar (1919—41) and the postwar (1947—1983)
periods.Annual nominal and real expenditures and deflator series are
available as far back as 1929 using Survey of Current Business
supplements, hereafter SCB.Prior to 1929, however, one must resort to
a number of sources to collect annual data which can be matched up to
the 1929 Commerce figures.Swanson and Williamson (1971), hereafter
S&W, contains nominal series for all the major national account cate-
gories for the period 1919 to 1928, which have been adjusted from
Kuznets' figures to conform to the SCB definitions.These annual
nominal series are used here for all the national accounts categories
except for investment in structures and foreign trade.The desired
division of investment into residential and non—residential structures
uses figures from Grebler, Blank and Winnick, hereafter CBW, and adjusts
nominal GNP accordingly.Net exports are broken down into the two
nominal components, exports and imports, using indices available in the
Statistical History of the U.S., which are then linked to the 1929 SCB
values.
This provides us with a complete set of annual nominal national
income accounts.The next task is to find implicit deflators for these
nominal series.Our starting point is the set of 5GB implicit deflators
for all the national income categories for the period 1929 to 1941.
Annual figures for the GNP deflator, 1919—1928, are obtained by linking
Kuznets' GNP deflator to the SCB 1929 implicit GNP deflator.As bothA-2
current and constant dollar indices are available for exports and
imports, it is possible to construct implicit deflators for both series
from 1919 to 1928 which can be matched to the SCB 1929 deflators.For
the remaining categories, such as consumption and investment, deflators
are not available for the period 1919 to 1928.To obtain figures for
this period, our interpolation program is run over the available annual
price series, 1929 to 1941,to produce quarterly figures.The final
regression is used to "back—forecast" the quarterly values over the
period 1919 to 1928.These quarterly values are then averaged to yield
annual price series for the period 1919—1928.With the complete set of
price deflators it is possible to convert the nominal national accounts
into real series covering the full 1919—41 period.The real annual
national account series are interpolated to arrive at a complete set of
real quarterly accounts and a corresponding set of deflators.
An interpolation procedure following that of Chow—Lin (1971) is
used in converting the annual series to quarterly observations.A more
complicated procedure, such as that suggested by Litterman (1981), is
deemed to be too costly compared to the possible gain in accuracy.The
procedure itself is fairly simple.As our annual series are annual
averages of quarterly variables, the procedure we use is that termed
"distribution" by Chow and Lin.In what follows upper case letters
represent annual series, and lower case letters represent the associated
quarterly series.To each annual series to be interpolated (Yft) is
associated a number of quarterly series (x1) that a priori information
suggests move within the year the way quarterly observations on the
annual dependent variable would.These quarterly explanatory variables
are annualized (x.)anda regression against the annual dependentA—3
variable is run;
(Al) 1. =X. +U
it it t
Itis assumed in each interpolation that the quarterly errors follow an
AR(l) process, which induces a complicated covariance structure on the
annual error, U.The first autocorrelation of U,A'
is related to
the quarterly autocorrelation coefficient, PQ by the non—linear
formula:
7 6 54.3 2 p+ 2p+ 3p+ 4p+ Jp+ 2p +p
2PQ+ 4PQ+ 6PQ+ 4
EstimatingA asthe first autocorrelation of the residuals from the
regression in (Al), we can obtain an estimate of by solving (A2), and
this is used in an iterative GLS procedure to obtain estimates
of and PQ•The final estimates from this procedure are then used to
generate quarterly observations for the dependent variable as:
(A3) it=X.
+Qt—l•
The assumption of AR(l) errors in the quarterly equation overcomes the
artificial choppiness induced if u is assumed to be white noise.This
procedure is used to derive the quarterly series for the implicit
deflators and real series of the national accounts as well as Summers' Q
andsome components of the cost of capital.TABLE Al
AnnualNational Time Period Independent Series
Account Category Interpolated in Interpolation
1) GNP (0)
—deflator —OD derived as residual
—real GNP —0 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTIIPTTDPTSLS
2) Consumer Durables (CDG)
—deflator —PDCDC 1929—1 ,1941—4 CTCPINF
—real —OCDG 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTIIPDCG
3) Consumer Non—Durables
and Services (CNDSV)
—deflator —PDCNDSV 1929—1 ,1941—4 CTCPI
—real —OCNDSV 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTIIPNDCGDPTSLS
4) Investment, Producer
Equipment (IPDE)
—deflator —PDIPDE 1929—1 ,1941—4 CTWPICPWGE
—real —OIPDE 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTIIPPC
5) Investment, Residential
Structures (IRSTR)
—deflator —PDIRSTR 1929—1 ,1941—4 CTWPICPWGE
—real —OIRSTR 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTCONSTRQRSTR
6) Investment,Nonresidential
Structures (NRSTR)
—deflator —PDINRSTR 1929—1 ,1941—4 CTWPICPWGE
—real —OINRSTR 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTCONSTRONRSTR
7) Investment, Change in
Inventories (IJ3INV)
real —OIBINV derived as residual
8) Government Purchases (C)
—deflator —PDC 1929—1 ,1941—4 CTCPWGE
—real —OG 1919—1 ,1941—4 CT
9) Exports (X)
—deflator —PDX 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTWPI
—real —OX 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTOXPROXY
Imports (M)
—deflator —PD1 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTWPI
—real—OM 1919—1 ,1941—4 CTOMPROXYA—4
2.Sources of Annual Interwar and Postwar Quarterly Variables
1) GNP
1919—28(annual):Implicit deflator constructed from a nominal and
a real GNP series available on NBER tape, dataset 08A Income and
Employment.Nominal GNP taken from S&W Table B—i, adjusted for the
use of the investment in structures series taken from GBW.
1919—41 (quarterly):The quarterly series for the GNP deflator was
calculated by adding up the real and nominal interpolated account
categories, except inventories and dividing the nominal sum by the
real Sum.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Nominal GNP series from SCB
Table1.1. Implicit deflator from SCB Table 7.1.All references to
SCB figures include the most recent updates and revisions.
2) Consumer Durable Expenditures
1919—28 (annual): Nominal expenditures from S&W Table B—2.
Implicit deflator constructed from interpolation.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Nominal series from SCBTable
1 •1,deflator from SCE Table 7 .1.
3) Consumer Non—Durables and Services
1919—28 (annual):Implicit deflator constructed from interpolation.
Nominal series is the sum of consumer semi—durables, perishables and
services from S&W Table B—2.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Nominal and real series are
the sum of consumer durables and services from SCB Tables 1.1 & 1.2
with the implicit deflator defined as the ratio of the nominal sum
to therealsum.A-5
4) Investment in Producers' Equipment
1919—1928 (annual):Implicit price deflator from interpolation,
nominal series from S&WTableB—3.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Nominal and real series are
the sum of the corresponding residential and non—residential
investment in producers' durable equipment SCB Tables 1.1 & 1.2
Implicit deflator is the ratio of the nominal sum to the real sum.
5) Investment Residential Structures
1919—28 (annual):Implicit deflator from interpolation.Nominal
series taken from GBW Table K—4 col. 4, does not include residential
investment in farm structures.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—1983 (quarterly):Nominal series for
residential construction, non—farm taken from SCB Table 1.1,
implicit deflator taken from SOB Table 7.1.
6) Investment in Non—Residential Structures
1919—28 (annual):Implicit deflator from interpolation.Nominal
series from GBd Table K—4 col.5, includes farm investment in
structures.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Real and nominal series are
the sum of non—residential and residential farm investment in
structures, SCB Tables 1.1 & 1.2.Implicit deflator is arrived at
by dividing the nominal sum by the real sum.
7) Change in Business Inventories
1919—1941 (quarterly):Both real and nominal series were arrived at
as residuals by subtracting from total real (nominal) GNP the real
(nominal) sum of all other account categories.
1947—83 (quarterly):Both real and nominal series taken from SOBA-6
Tables 1.1 & 1.2.
8) Government Purchases of Goods and Services
1919—28 (annual):Price deflator from the interpolation, nominal
purchases from S&WTableB—i.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Deflator from SCB Table 7.1
and nominal series from SCB Table 1.1
9) Exports
1919—28 (annual):Real and nominal series constructed by matching
constant arid current dollar indices from the Statistical History of
the U.S., series U21 and U22, to the SCB export series in 1929.The
deflator was then defined as the ratio of the real and nominal
series.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Deflator from SCB Table 7.1
and nominal series from SCB Table 1.1
10) Imports
1919—28 (annual):Real and nominal series constructed by matching
constant and current dollar indices from the Statistical History,
series 1J33 and U34, to the SCB import series in 1929.The deflator
is then defined as the ratio of the real and nominal series.
1929—41 (annual) 1947—83 (quarterly):Deflator from SCB Table 7.1
and nominal series from 5GB Table 1.1
11) Capital Stock, Equipment and Structures
1925—1983 (annual)Nominal and real series for the two types of
capital stock, equipment and structures, was taken from various
issues of SGB.Nominal and real series for the capital stok of
consumer durables was taken fron ?1usgrave (1979).In order to
utilize the information available from our associated quarterlyA-7
investment series in constructing each quarterly capital stock
series, we followed the iterative procedure:
a.the annual series provide a beginning and ending value
for the capital stock
b.assuming a fixed exponential rate of depreciation, the
quarterly series must satisfy
Kt= + (1—)K1
The procedureuses the starting value of the capital stock and the
associated quarterly I series, iterating on ô until the value of
the quarterly capital stock at the end of the period is "close" to
the specified ending value.Below we present the estimated annual
depreciation rate for each type of capital stock in each of the sub—
periods.
Non—residential Structures 1919—1941 6 6.396
1947—1983 =6.036
Consumer Durable Goods 1919—1941 5=20.40
1947—1983 =20.63
Producers' Durable Equipment 1919—1941 5 14.88
1947—1961 =13.80
1962—1983 =14.96A-8
3.Rental Price of Capital Services
The rental price of capital services, for equipment and for






Acomposite cost of capital series was constructed by weighting each
of CE and Cs by their share in the sum of the capital stock of
equipment and structures.Individual components of the cost of
capital services are:
=Depreciationrate of the net stock of producer's durable
estimated iteratively as explained above in Section 2.
=Depreciationrate of the net stock of nonresidential
structure estimated iteratively as above in Section 2.
DUM Dummyvariable, set equal to 1.0 for the duration of the
Long amendment to the Revenue Act of 1962, and set equal
to zero in all other periods.
=Implicitdeflator for investment in producers' durable
equipment, from Section 2.
P1 =Implicitdeflator for investment in nonresidential
structures, from Section 2.
RITCE=Rateof investment tax credit on equipment investment,
from Jorgenson and Sullivan, (1981), hereafter J—S.A-9
RITCs=Rate of investmenttax credit on nonresidential
structures investment, from J—S.
TAX =Highestmarginal tax rate on corporate income from Tax
Foundation (1979).
r =Discountrate which is calculated as the Moody's Baa
corporate bond yield minus the expected rate of
inflation.The construction of the expected inflation
rate is discussed in the text.
ZE Present value of one dollar's worth of depreciation on
equipment.Figures for 1947—83 are from J—S, while
figures for 1919—41 are calculated using straight—line
depreciation, average asset life for the period from J—S
and the Baa corporate bond rate.
Z =Presentvalue of one dollar's worth of depreciation on
nonresidential structures.Figures for 1947—83 are from
J—S,whilefigures for 1919—41 are calculated using
straight—line depreciation, average asset life for the
period from J—S and the Baa corporate bond rate.A- 10
4.Sources of Interwar Quarterly Variables
The data utilized in this section were made available, in part, by
the Inter—University Consortium for Political and Social Research.The
data for macroeconomic time series were originally collected by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
C =Constantterm used in the regression.
CONSTR=Indexof total construction, s.a.Monthly observations from
NBER tape, dataset (J2A Construction:data originally
collected for Engineering News—Record Yearbook
CPI =Consumerprice index, all items, s.a.
CPINF =Consumerprice index, less food, s.a.Monthly observations
for both taken from NBER tape, dataset 04A Prices:data
originally collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
CPWCE =Indexof composite wages, s.a.Monthly observations from
NBER tape, dataset 08A Income and Employment:data
originally collected by the Federal Reserve board and the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
DPTSLS=Physicalvolume of department store sales, s.a.Monthly
observations taken from NI3ER tape, dataset 06A Distribution
of Commodities:data originally collected by the Federal
Reserve Board.
IIPTT =Indexof industrial production, total, s.a.
IIPDCG=Indexof industrial production, durable consumer goods, s.a.
IIPNDCG =Indexof industrial production, durable consumer goods, s.a.
IIPPG =Indexof industrial production, producers' goods, s.a.
Monthly observations on the above four variables taken from
NBER tape, dataset O1A Production of Commodities:dataA-il
originally collected by the Federal Reserve Board and the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
QNRSTR=Realvalue of contracts for industrial buildings, s.a.
Quarterly observations arrived at by deflating the value of
contracts for industrial buildings (from NBER tape, dataset
02B Construction: originally collected by the Federal
Reserve Board) by the interpolated deflator for non-
residential structures.
QRSTR =Realvalue of residential construction contracts, s.a.
Quarterly observations arrived at by deflating value of
residential contracts (from NBER tape, dataset 02B
Construction:originally collected by Engineering News—
Record) by the interpolated deflator for residential
structures.
QMPROXY =Constructedvariable for real imports, s.a.A quarterly
nominal series on imports, which did not match the SCB
definition, was deflated bythe interpolatedWPI.The
nominal import series was taken from NBER tape, dataset 07A
Foreign Trade:originally the data appeared in the Monthly
Summary of Foreign Commerce, various issues.
QXPROXY =Constructedvariable for real exports, s.a.A quarterly
nominal series on exports, which did not match the SCB
definition, was deflated by the interpolated WPI.The
nominal export series was taken from NBER tape, dataset 07A
Foreign Trade:originally appeared in the Monthly Summary
of Foreign Commerce, various issues.
RBAA Yield on corporate bonds, Moody's Baa rating.MonthlyA-12
observations originally collected by Moody's Investors
Service, taken from Federal Reserve Board and various issues
of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
RHCPBD Yield on corporate bonds, highest rating.Monthly
observations from NBER tape, dataset 13A Interest Rates:
data originally collected by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
STKPRCE =Indexof all common stock prices, N.Y.S.E.Monthly
observations from NBER tape, dataset hA Security Markets:
data originally collected by Standard and Poor's.
T =Trendterm appearing in the regression.
WPI =Wholesaleprice index, all items, s.a.Monthly observations
taken from NBER tape, dataset 04A Prices:data originally
collected by Babson Statistical Organization.REFERENCE S
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